Volume 39

Issue 1

Article 6

1994

AIDSPHOBIA: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of
Compensation for Fear of a Deadly Disease
Victoria L. Rees

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons

Recommended Citation
Victoria L. Rees, AIDSPHOBIA: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Compensation for Fear of a Deadly
Disease, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 241 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss1/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Rees: AIDSPHOBIA: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Compensation for

1994]

Comment
AIDSPHOBIA: FORCING COURTS TO FACE NEW AREAS OF
COMPENSATION FOR FEAR OF A DEADLY DISEASE

I.

INTRODUCTION

When Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)1 emerged in
the consciousness of American society during the summer of 1981, the
highly-feared, contagious and fatal disease was seldom discussed and
thought to be largely confined to male homosexuals and intravenous drug
users.2 AIDS remains highly-feared, contagious and fatal, affecting numer5
4
3
ous societal institutions, such as government, education, entertainment,
1. AIDS "is a specific group of diseases or conditions which are indicative of
severe immunosuppression related to infection with the human immunodeficiency
virus." Kathryn Kruse, Recent Development, Snyder v. Mekhjian: New Jersey AIDS
Assistance Act Permits Limited Discovery of Blood Donor Information by Plaintiff Suing
Health Care Entityfor Contraction of AIDS Through Blood Transfusion, 37 VILL. L. REv.
337, 337 n.1 (1992) (quoting CENrERs FOR DISEASE CONTROL, HIV/AIDS SuRvEILLANCE REPORT 1 (1991) [hereinafter HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE REPORT]). AIDS is
caused by the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Kruse, supra,at 337 n.1 (citing John Howard, HIV Screening: Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues, 9J. LEGAL MED.
601, 601 (1988) (citing Samuel Broder & Robert Gallo, A Pathogenic Retrovirus
(HTLV-Ill) Linked to AIDS, 311NEw ENG. J. MED. 1292 (1984))).
2. Once called the "gay plague" because it attacked many homosexual men,
early cases of AIDS were also detected in male Haitian refugees, intravenous drug
users and hemophiliacs of both sexes. Disease, UPI, Oct. 27, 1982, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. By October 27, 1982, over 600 cases of AIDS had
been reported nationally, including 260 fatalities. Id. By March, 1983, the number
of reported cases had increased to 1100, with a 40% fatality rate. Disease,UPI, Mar.
4, 1983, availablein LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File. One year later, the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC) reported 3,572 AIDS cases nationally, a figure three times
that of the previous year. AIDS, Reuters Ltd., Mar. 5, 1984, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File. The CDC also reported that approximately one-half of
those diagnosed with the disease since 1981 had died. Id.
3. See, e.g., Dean Lokken, Doctor Rules Out Moral Bias in AIDS Report to Reagan,
Reuters Ltd., Sept. 2, 1987, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (chairman
of President Reagan's Commission on AIDS) (defending commission's study of
and commitment.to AIDS, stating that commission focuses on medical aspects of
disease, not religious and moral considerations).
4. See, e.g., Case of AIDS Victim Barredfrom School Under Review, UPI, Sept. 19,
'1985, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting school officials discussion of whether Ryan White, who contracted AIDS in 1984 during treatment for
hemophilia, "should be treated as a special education student, admitted to school
or taught at home"); Mother to Appeal "Glass Cage"Ruling,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1988,
at A14 (reporting opposition by mother of AIDS-infected child to court decision
that child may attend school if she remains behind glass partition in classroom);
Profs: Teach Kids About AIDS Early, UPI, June 26, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (reporting Ball State University professors encouragement of
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sports, 6 labor, 7 the public health care system, 8 and medicine. 9 Not surprisingly, issues surrounding AIDS have now found their way into American courtrooms.' 0 Even less surprising are the tremendous difficulties
AIDS-education programs that begin as early as first grade and call teenage sex "an
AIDS time bomb").
5. See, e.g., AIDS FearInhibits Hollywood Love Scenes, UPI, Feb. 4, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (observing that fear of contracting AIDS permeated Hollywood community since death of Rock Hudson); Carla Hall, Rally Against
AIDS, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 1985, at BIO (noting that Hollywood stars gathered for
mammoth fundraiser to raise money for victims of AIDS).
6. See, e.g., Newswire, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1987, § 3 (Sports), at 6 (reporting
that Florida health officials were considering case of weightlifter who tested positive for exposure to AIDS as first documented case of AIDS virus passing from one
steroids user to another through use of shared needle).
7. See Wayne R. Cohen, An Economic Analysis of the Issues SurroundingAIDS in
the Workplace: In the Long Run, the Path of Truth and Reason Cannot Be Diverted, 41
AM. U. L. REv. 1199, 1231 (1992) (noting that although employers may feel pressure to seek out infected employees and discriminate against them, economically
speaking, "discrimination against persons with HIV is inefficient to society as well
as to the individual employer" in that investment in training of employees and
productivity levels are lost); see also Confronting a Killer, Bus. INS., Oct. 7, 1991, at 8
(discussing impact of AIDS in workplace, including costs of providing educational
programs and additional health care services); Thomas Omestad, Firefighters Wary
After Exposure to Victim of AIDS, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1985, § 2 (Metro), at 7 (noting
that fire department would not adopt separate policy for handling AIDS victims
unless research shows disease could be spread by routine contact).
8. See, e.g., Official Proposes Giving Needles to Addicts, UPI,July 24, 1986, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that New Jersey health officials were
considering giving drug addicts sterilized needles in effort to slow spread of AIDS).
9. See, e.g., Nieson Himmel & Edward J. Boyer, AIDS Patient, Target of Phony
Physician's Call, Dies, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1986, § 1, at 3 (discussing hospital AIDS
patient who survived coma induced by near-fatal dose of insulin ordered by man
claiming to be his physician, but then dies days later from AIDS complications);
Spencer S. Hsu, Physician Makes Free Tests His Weapon in War on AIDS, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 24, 1989, § 9 (Westside), at I (reporting that leading Los Angeles AIDS expert who organized program that provides free, anonymous HIV tests, has nationwide attention and support for his effort to "signal to doctors and patients that the
battle against AIDS will be a long and difficult one, and that testing and education
remain the most effective means of fighting the disease").
One issue that has raised particular concern in the medical community is the
prevalence of AIDS among newborn infants. See AIDS Problem Growingfor Infants,
Panel Told, CHic. TRIB., Dec. 19, 1987, at C3. In 1987, 533 infants had been diagnosed with AIDS, and early estimates predicted that by 1991 there would be as
many as 10,000 to 20,000 cases of pediatric AIDS. Id. Medical experts have
surmised that two-thirds of all infants with AIDS contract the disease from their
infected mothers, most of whom became infected through intravenous drug use,
which includes sharing needles with other drug users or having sexual intercourse
with AIDS-infected drug users. Id. The Presidential Commission on AIDS reported that, while the rate of AIDS infection among homosexuals was declining in
1987, the rate of transmission among intravenous drug users was increasing. Id.
10. David Margolick, Legal System Is Assailed on AIDS Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19,
1992, § 1, at 16; see AIDS Policy PutsJudges on Hot Seat, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1988, at
C6 (reporting decisions by Alabama district judges that require AIDS-infected defendants to enter guilty pleas and receive sentences by telephone has precipitated
debate as to whether judges are jeopardizing right to receive fair trial);Judge Won't
Bar Defendants With AIDS, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 1988, at A9 (noting that one of
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courts have faced in wrestling with the legal issues presented by one of the
most feared diseases of this century.1 1
One such difficulty arises when a plaintiff seeks relief under an intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress theory for fear of contractingAIDS as a result of a defendant's conduct. Often, these claims are
brought even though the plaintiff has tested negatively for the virus causing this deadly disease.' 2 Accepting the validity of such negative test resuits leads to the conclusion that such a plaintiff was not exposed to the
AIDS virus and, as a result, will not contract AIDS. 13 Such plaintiffs, however, still may seek and recover relief for the fear of contracting AIDS in
the future. 14 This cause of action is now known as a claim for
5
"AIDSphobia." '
Prior to this relatively recent AIDSphobia litigation, courts encountered plaintiffs seeking compensation for their fear of contracting a future
three Alabama judges who said they would bar AIDS-infected defendants from
courtroom and conduct court-related procedures over telephone decides to allow
such individuals in courtroom); N.Y. Court System Adopts Guides on Infectious Disease
Protection, Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP., Jan. 25, 1988, at 113 (describing guidelines
published by New York State Office of Court Administration that allow court personnel to wear surgical masks, gloves and other protective gear "when dealing with
aggressive persons with infectious and fatal viral diseases").
11. See, e.g.,
Mike McKee, Suit Can Proceed Against Makers of ClottingAgent; Ninth
Circuit Raps Standard-of-CareDefense, THE RECORDER, July 30, 1992, at 3 (reporting
court's holding that manufacturers of clotting agent are not immune from liability
for not testing their blood supplies in early 1980s simply because no one in industry tested supplies prior to 1984); Howard Mintz, Plaintiffs' Bar, Government Nearing
Showdown Over AIDS Researcher Depositions; Texas LitigantsAmong Those Who Failed to
Get Testimony, TEX. LAW., Aug. 27, 1990, at 7 (discussing situation in which plaintiffs' lawyers in two dozen transfusion-related negligence cases locked in battle with
government officials over taking deposition of top AIDS researcher at CDC who
might have advised blood banks in early 1980s to guard against transmission of
AIDS through blood transfusions).
12. HIV is a retrovirus that attacks the human immune system by invading
host cells, replicating itself, weakening the immune system and ultimately destroying the body's capacity to ward off disease. Jonathan N. Weber & Robin A. Weiss,
HIVInfection: The Cellular Picture,Scr. AM., Oct. 1988, at 100, 100-09; see William A.
Haseltine & Flossie Wong-Staal, The Molecular Biology of the AIDS Virus, Scr. Am., Oct.
1988, at 52, 52-62. Various blood tests are used to determine the presence of HIV
antibodies in the bloodstream. Haseltines & Wong-Staal. supra, at 52. HIV may
remain dormant in an individual for up to 10 years before symptoms appear. Id.
For a discussion of the tests used to detect the presence of HIV antibodies in the
bloodstream, see infra note 116.
13. Medical studies indicate that at least 95% of those infected with HIV will
test positive for the virus within six months of contracting it. C. Robert Horsburgh
et al., Duration of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection of Antibody,
THE LANCET, Sept. 16, 1989, at 637, 637. These individuals, however, will not necessarily manifest the symptoms of full-blown AIDS within this time period. Id.
14. For a list of cases involving plaintiffs who sought recovery for their AIDSphobia after testing negative for HIV, see infra note 118.
15. See Harry H. Lipsig, AIDS Phobia and Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress,
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 1992, at 3 (discussing expanded tort of negligent infliction of
emotional distress brought by plaintiffs who fear contracting future disease).
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disease in other contexts, 16 such as claims for fear of cancer, commonly
called "cancerphobia."1 7 Because courts generally view these "phobia"
claims as an identifiable subset of emotional distress claims, courts require
proof of the traditional elements of a cause of action for emotional distress before the plaintiff may recover for his or her fear of contracting the
disease. 18
The uniqueness of AIDS, however, including the limited methods of
transmission and incurable nature, raises more judicial concerns than
many other diseases. Additionally, unlike cases in which the plaintiff alleges emotional distress based on proof of exposure to the AIDS virus,
cases in which the plaintiff's exposure to the virus is questionable at best
present courts with troublesome issues. Such issues include difficult evidentiary problems and public policy considerations. 19
This Comment first discusses claims based on the fear of contracting a
future disease-the so-called "phobia" claims-as an identifiable subset of
emotional distress claims. This Comment then explores the litigated
AIDSphobia claims and analyzes the various problems of proof these
claims have raised. Finally, this Comment proposes that courts should be
guided by the evidentiary and public policy standards developed by courts
in other "phobia" cases. Such an approach fairly determines which AIDSphobia claims, if any, are compensable.
II.

BACKGROUND

The tort of emotional distress underlies and supports the attendant
legal principles of AIDSphobia cases. As a result, an AIDSphobia claim, as
with other phobia claims, is simply an outgrowth of an emotional distress
claim. Unlike a general emotional distress claim, however an AIDSphobia
claim raises considerations unique to the disease itself.
This section provides the necessary background for understanding
"phobia" litigation generally and AIDSphobia litigation specifically. Highlighting one category of distress that results from fear of developing a future disease, this section discusses the torts of intentional and negligent
infliction of emotional distress in this context. This section also briefly
explores the circumstances giving rise to cancerphobia litigation and its
general acceptance among courts.
16. For a further discussion of claims for fear of a future disease or condition,
see infra notes 41-53 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of cancerphobia claims, see infra, notes 44-53 and
accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the elements required to prove the torts of negligent
infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress, see
infra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the issues that AIDSphobia claims present to courts,
see infra notes 54-96 and accompanying text.
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The Emotional Distress Torts

Elements of an Emotional Distress Claim

Tort law recognizes two types of emotional distress-based claims: intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. To establish a prima facie case for intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant's conduct
was "extreme and outrageous;" 20 (2) the defendant intended to cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff;21 (3) the defendant's extreme and
outrageous conduct caused the plaintiff to suffer emotional distress; 22 and
(4) the plaintiff's emotional distress was severe.2 3 To establish a prima
facie case for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must
20. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 12, at 60 (5th ed. 1984) (stating rule that emerged in which there is liability for
"conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society, of a nature
which is especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very
serious kind"). In addition, the extreme and outrageous character of the conduct
"may arise not so much from what is done as from abuse by the defendant of some
relation or position which gives the defendant actual or apparent power to damage
the plaintiff's interests." Id. at 61; see, e.g., Boyle v. Wenck, 392 N.E.2d 1053 (Mass.
1979) (holding that defendant's conduct of making repeated, harassing phone
calls to plaintiff after being told that plaintiff recently returned from hospital as
extreme and outrageous conduct); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.
App. 3d 376 (Ct. App. 1970) (holding insurance company's refusal to pay benefits
owed to plaintiff in order to force plaintiff to settle claim for less was outrageous
conduct). But see Burgess v. Perdue, 721 P.2d 239, 243 (Kan. 1986) (holding that
physician's conduct of informing mother of deceased patient that he kept son's
brain in jar for autopsy purposes was not extreme and outrageous conduct);
Munley v. ISC Fin. House, Inc., 584 P.2d 1336, 1340 (Okla. 1978) (holding that
leaving collection agency cards on plaintiff's door and contacting plaintiff's neighbors, former employer and apartment manager did not amount to extreme and
outrageous conduct).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines "extreme and outrageous conduct" as
conduct that exceeds "all bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and

utterly intolerable in a civilized community."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 46 cmt. d (1965).

21. Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 147-48 (Va. 1974). To satisfy this
element, the plaintiff may prove that the defendant's conduct was only recklessthat is, that the defendant acted in deliberate disregard of the high probability that
his or her actions would cause emotional distress. Id. at 148. A showing of intent,
where the defendant "had the specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress,"
also satisfies this element. Id. If the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress, and the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's sensitivity, intent or

recklessness may be inferred from his or her conduct. Hanke v. Global Van Lines,
Inc., 533 F.2d 396, 400-01 (8th Cir. 1976).
22. Womack, 210 S.E.2d at 148. The causation element has evolved over the

history of the emotional distress tort. For a discussion of how this evolution provided the impetus for the birth of phobia claims, see infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
23. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 616 (Md. 1977). Under this element, the
plaintiff must prove that the emotional distress caused by the defendant is more
than a "reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure." Id. at
617 (quoting Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 (Ct.
App. 1970)).
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prove the requisite elements of a standard negligence claim: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached this duty;
(3) the defendant's breach of duty caused the plaintiff harm; and (4) the
plaintiff has suffered injury. 24 The nature of a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim has presented plaintiffs with obstacles in proving a
prima facie case. For example, the issue of whether a plaintiff has alleged
physical injury that was either caused or accompanied by severe emotional
distress continues to trouble many courts, as well as plaintiffs.

25

Additional policy considerations also make establishing a prima facie
case of negligent infliction of emotional distress more difficult. One such
policy consideration concerns the danger of fraudulent claims.2

6

A fur-

ther concern is that permitting such claims may open the "floodgates" to
significant amounts of litigation that many courts are ill-equipped to
27
handle.
2.

ProvingEmotional Distress Claims

The obstacles encountered in proving traditional emotional distress
claims resemble those encountered by plaintiffs instituting AIDSphobia
cases. A historical overview of the proof issues troubling courts that consider emotional distress claims, therefore, aids understanding these same
problems in phobia cases. Although acknowledging emotional harm mer24. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, at § 30 (discussing traditional formula
for cause of action based on negligence).
25. See generally Michele A. Scott, Proving Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: The Negligent Infliction ofEmotional Distress, 11 CARDOZO L. Rxv. 235 (1989) (discussing evolution of emotional distress claim, focusing on proof of injury required by courts).
Supporting the view that some physical injury must be alleged before a defendant
may be held liable for the infliction of emotional distress is the language used by

the Restatement (Second) of'Torts: If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an

unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other

compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance." RE§ 436A (1965) (emphasis added). For a further

STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

discussion of the physical injury requirement in emotional distress cases, see infra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
26. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 54, at 361-65. Emotional distress claims that are unaccompanied by any physical manifestation of the mental
disturbance, which raise concerns of fraud, may be described in the following
manner:
The temporary emotion of fright, so far from serious that it does no physical harm, is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually so
trivial, that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff
against mere negligence, where the elements of extreme outrage and
moral blame which have had such weight in the intentional tort context
are lacking.
Id. at 361 (citation omitted).
27. See id. at 360, 361 (noting that one of the primary concerns that continues
to "foster judicial caution and doctrinal limitations on recovery for emotional distress... [is] the problem of permitting legal redress for harm that is often temporary and relatively trivial").
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its compensation equal to that awarded for physical harm, courts were initially hesitant to recognize emotional distress as compensable injury,
especially in negligence actions. 28 The policy underlying this reluctance
29
aims chiefly at preventing adjudication of fraudulent or frivolous claims.
In order to assure the validity of alleged emotional injury, courts required
a demonstration of some physical injury either accompanying or resulting
from the emotional upset. 30 Courts in some jurisdictions modified this
physical injury requirement by demanding the plaintiff demonstrate physical impact to his or her person.3 1 In a majority ofjurisdictions today, how28. See generally Fournier J. Gale III & James L. Goyer III, Recovery for
Cancerphobiaand Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 CuMB. L. REv. 723, 725 (1985). The
reasons courts frequently gave to justify their reluctance to award emotional distress damages included protection of the judicial system from "litigation in the
field of trivialities and mere bad manners" and the fear of frivolous claims. Id.
(citing Spade v. Lynn & Bros. R.R., 47 N.E. 88, 89 (Mass. 1897)). Therefore, courts
limited recovery by "promoting the 'underlying policy.., of compensating plaintiffs with clearly recognizable serious injuries, while not burdening either the judicial system or individual defendants' with injuries that are 'trivial, evanescent,
feigned or imagined.'" Id. (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 179
(Mass. 1982); see alsoJulie A. Davies, DirectActions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise
Possible, 67 WASH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1992) (noting that while most courts acknowledge
that negligently inflicted emotional injury may merit compensation, intangible
character of emotional harm reinforced courts' shared conviction that recovery
must be limited); Corey Scott Cramin, Comment, Emotional Distress Damages for
Cancerphobia:A Case for the DES Daughter, 14 PAC. L.J. 1215, 1226 (1983) (noting
that "[e]arly decisions demonstrated reluctance to award damages for emotional

harm"). See generally KEETON

ET AL.,

supra note 20, § 54, at 359-67 (noting that

courts have been hesitant to recognize negligently caused emotional distress because of: (1) problem of permitting legal redress for "temporary or relatively trivial" harm; (2) danger of falsification or imagination of claims for mental harm;
and (3) "perceived unfairness of imposing heavy and disproportionate financial
burdens upon a defendant, whose conduct was only negligent, for consequences
which appear remote from the 'wrongful' act").
29. See Cramin, Comment, supra note 28, at 1226 (noting courts' "overriding
policyconcern[ ] focus[ing) on the dual desire of the courts to hear only genuine
claims and to prevent a flood of litigation").
30. See e.g., Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 178-79 (Mass. 1982) (giving reasons for not recognizing emotional distress without physical injury, including fact that emotional distress is not serious enough; that allowing such recovery is
likely to overburden judicial system; that physical harm lends element of genuineness to claim; and that unless defendant's conduct is intentional, he should not be
held liable for "purely mental disturbance").
31. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 726-27. Many states adopted this modification. Id.; see KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, .§ 54, at 363 (noting that physical
impact is not immediate physical harm, but result of plaintiff's emotional distress
over negligently caused event-such as miscarriage or heart attack). However, this
rule has been much criticized and virtually abandoned in all but a few jurisdictions. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 726-27.
The physical injury and impact rules limiting recovery for emotional distress
served two basic policy objectives: To ensure that a defendant's liability for his
negligence would not be disproportionate to his fault, and to "prevent litigation of
trivial and/or fraudulent cases." Davies, supra note 28, at 3. Issues of fairness and
resource allocation drive both of these policies. Id. For a further discussion of the
physical injury requirement, as well as the tests that courts employ to determine
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ever, courts do not require a showing of physical impact if a plaintiff can
establish that he or she was within the zone of dangerof a defendant's negligent act. 32 Conversely, in a minority of jurisdictions, courts still require
plaintiffs, even those within the zone of danger, to manifest physical injury
resulting from his or her emotional distress."3
Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions, even with these prerequisites to
recovery, emotional distress torts have evolved from strictly "parasitic" torts
to independent causes of action.3 4 For example, in the most "liberal" jurisdictions, courts recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as a
completely independent cause of action. 35 Other courts take a more
"moderate" view, dictating that in order to recover damages for emotional
distress unaccompanied by physical injury, the plaintiff must show emotional injury to be both "serious and reasonably foreseeable."3 6 Generally
speaking, serious emotional distress is described as "both severe and
debilitating. 3 7 In determining whether emotional injury was reasonably
foreseeable, courts will look to a variety of factors.38 Finally, some courts
remain skeptical of negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort and continue to require some physical manifestation of
39
distress.
whether the plaintiff has met this requirement, see supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
32. Cramin, Comment, supra note 28, at 1227 & n.108.
33. See Gottshall v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 1993i,
rev'd 114 S. Ct. 2396 (1994). The Gottshallcourt stated that a minority of courts
employ the "physical impact" rule, which "requires a contemporaneous physical
injury or impact to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress." Id.; see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965) (noting that negligent actor is

not liable when actor's conduct results in emotional disturbance only, without
physical harm or other compensable damage).
34. See Cramin, Comment, supra note 28, at 1226 (stating that "courts have
rapidly evolved in recent years in the recognition of a person's mental health as a
protectable interest").
35. See Mary Ann Galante, %%en the Mind Is Hurt: Courts Around U.S. Permitting
More Payments for Psychic Harm, NAT'L L.J., May 28, 1984, at 1, 28 (noting that at
least eight states recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress as independent cause of action). Five states (Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, Missouri and
Washington) require the plaintiff to demonstrate some objective symptoms of the
emotional injury allegedly suffered, "largely to eliminate fake claims." Id. Three
other states (California, Hawaii and Maine) require only that the jury find that the
plaintiff "reacted reasonably under the circumstances." Id.
36. Paugh v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (Ohio 1983) (holding that cause of
action may be stated for negligent infliction of emotional distress without manifestation of physical injury, although proof of physical injury is admissible as evidence
of degree of emotional distress suffered).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 766. These factors include whether the plaintiff was "located near
the scene" of the accident; whether the shock resulted from "a direct emotional
impact upon the plaintiff from sensory and contemporaneous observance" of the
accident; and whether the plaintiff and victim were "closely related." Id.
39. Galante, supra note 35, at 28 (using Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts as example of court that refused to award damages to group of "DES daugh-
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Recovery for Emotional Distress Due to the Fear of a Future Disease or
Condition

In response to increased judicial acceptance of independent emotional distress claims, many plaintiffs continue to push the boundaries of
emotional distress recovery. 40 This trend has resulted in substantial
awards for mental distress that are only remotely, if at all, related to physical harm suffered. 4 1 Consequently, the expansion of recovery for emotional distress has led to an attendant expansion in the types of emotional
distress claims alleged.
A commonly litigated emotional distress claim arises from the anxiety
allegedly suffered by a person who harbors fear of contracting or sucters" who could not demonstrate evidence of physical harm that accompanied
their fear of cancer (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982))).
40. Id. at 1.
41. Id. The results among courts have been mixed. However, some impressive emotional distress victories in which physical injury has been "scant" include
the following: Arceneaux v. Johns-Manville, LASC No. 260808 (1981) (plaintiff
received $105,000 as compensation for fear of contracting asbestosis-related disease, where only physical symptom was shortness of breath, even though plaintiff
was longtime smoker); Directo v. Johns-Mansville, LASC No. 259023 (1981) (71year-old nonsmoker with only minimal findings of asbestosis awarded $265,000 for
shortness of breath); Zeller v. American Safety Razor, 443 N.E.2d 1349 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1982) (plaintiff received $1.2 million for fear that tips of two surgical blades
that broke off during surgery might puncture blood vessel), petitionfor review denied, 447 N.E,2d 670 (Mass. 1983); and De La Garza v. South Pac. Transp., Civ. 80139 TUC ACM (1990) (awarding plaintiff $133,000 from railroad for fear that eyesight might become damaged where only physical complaint was dry eyes caused
by exposure to chlorine gas). Galante, supra note 35, at 1, 28.
Some experts believe that the trend towards recovery for emotional distress
without accompanying physical injury began with the California Supreme Court's
decision in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), which established the standard for recovery by a third party who witnessed the negligent injury of another.
Galante, supra note 35, at 28. This decision, in addition to that in Molien v. Kaiser
Foundation Hospitals, 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980), established the California
Supreme Court as a trendsetter in this area of recovery. For a discussion of Dillon
and Molien and the state of recovery for emotional distress damages in California,
see Cramin, Comment, supra note 28, at 1227-30.
Another pacesetting court in the area of recovery for emotional distress is the
Hawaii Supreme Court. See Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066
(Haw. 1981) (awarding family damages for serious emotional distress resulting
from death of dog caused by defendant's negligence without witnessing defendant's tortious conduct); Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758 (Haw. 1974) (considering
boy's claim that he suffered emotional distress after witnessing death of step-grandmother but without incurring physical harm); Rodrigues v. State, 472,P.2d 509
(Haw. 1970) (permitting homeowner to sue highway department for negligence,
including mental distress, for flood damage to home).
High courts in Massachusetts and Ohio, like those in California and Hawaii,
have adopted a liberal approach to emotional distress recovery. Although these
courts constitute what is still a minority position, the trend is toward recognizing
additional and different theories of recovery for emotional distress. Galante, supra
note 35, at'28. This expansion invites greater attorney creativity in devising theories that will support recovery. Id.
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cumbing to a future disease or other debilitating condition. 4 2 In courts
that recognize this type of emotional distress, the claim is generally characterized as judicially-approved relief for the plaintiff's current emotional
pain associated with a possible future condition. 43 These courts hold that a
plaintiff's fear of contracting a future disease constitutes a proper element
44
of damages, even when the alleged fear proves to be mistaken.
Claims based on fear of contracting cancer exemplify this type of
emotional distress. The term "cancerphobia" was first used in the 1958
case of Ferrarav. Galluchio.45 Today, fear of cancer has been litigated so
frequently that many courts now recognize cancerphobia as a specific and
identifiable type of emotional distress.4 6 In Ferrara,New York's highest
state court granted recovery to the plaintiff for her fear of developing cancer after exposure to extreme amounts of radiation from unnecessary xrays. 4 7 The court's reasons for allowing recovery included the inherent
42. See generally David Carl Minneman, Annotation, FutureDisease or Condition,
or Anxiety Relating Thereto, as Element of Recovey, 50 A.L.R.4TH 13 (1986). For example, actions for fear of the following diseases or conditions have been litigated:
cancer; brain, muscle and nervous system disorders, such as epilepsy or paralysis;

bone and joint diseases; heart and blood circulatory diseases; and reproductive
organ diseases. Id. at 68-95. In addition, complaints alleging fear of a more general health condition, rather than a specific disease, have been successfully litigated. Id. at 65-68. Examples of these nonspecific claims include fear of the
consequences of foreign objects lodged in the body, of drinking contaminated
water and of body parts injured in automobile accidents. Id.
43. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 729.
44. Id. at 730. As one court explained:
That the fear regarded a possibility rather than a probability would not alter

the reality of the mental suffering, unless the jury found the fear so fantastic as to make them believe that it was not in fact entertained.
Whether the one entertaining the fear has done all he reasonably could
to control his apprehension may be inquired into on the principle of

mitigation of damages.
Id. (quoting Smith v. Boston & Me. R.R., 177 A. 729, 738 (N.H. 1935)).
45. 152 N.E.2d 249 (N.Y. 1958).
46. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 724 ("The term 'cancerphobia' has been
used by courts and commentators to describe emotional distress caused by the fear
of developing cancer.") (citation omitted). Cancerphobia has been described as
"a phobic reaction or apprehension that was experienced by the plaintiff, due to

her fear of contracting cancer in the future. The medical definition of a phobic
reaction, however, is the recurrent experience of dread of a specific event or object in the absence of objective danger." Id. (quoting Corey Scott Cramin, Comment,
Emotional Distress Damagesfor Cancerphobia: A Casefor the DES Daughter, 14 PAC. L.J.
1215, 1215 n.1 (1983) (emphasis added) (citing PHILIP SOLOMON & VERNON D.
PATCH, HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 77 (3d ed. 1974)).

As in the Comment by Cramin and the article by Gale and Goyer,
cancerphobia and AIDSphobia in this Comment refers to an anxiety, rather than a
true phobia. An "anxiety is defined as a normal response to threats towards one's
body, possessions, way of life, loved ones, or cherished values." Gale & Goyer,
supra note 28, at 724-25 & n.7 (emphasis added).
47. Ferrara,152 N.E.2d at 251-52.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss1/6

10

Rees: AIDSPHOBIA: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Compensation for

1994]

AIDSPHOBIA

authenticity of the claim and the common knowledge among lay people
48
that the wounds suffered by the plaintiff frequently resulted in cancer.
Since Ferrarawas decided, claims for cancerphobia have arisen most
frequently in diethylstilbestrol (DES), asbestosis and medical malpractice
litigation. 49 In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs have successfully brought
claims based on a fear of contracting cancer.5 0 Notwithstanding judicial
fear of fraud in traditional emotional distress claims, many courts have
held that a plaintiff may recover for fear of contracting cancer without
proving that a future cancer will likely or probably result. 5 ' Instead, courts
usually decide to award damages for a plaintiff's cancerphobia based upon

48. Id. at 252-53. Ferrara's physician also testified that he had told the plaintiff that her radiation burns might be cancerous and recommended that they be
examined regularly. Id.
49. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 730. DES was a drug "marketed... as a
preventative for miscarriages, and was widely prescribed by physicians." Id. at 730
n.42 (quoting Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 173 (Mass. 1982)). "Asbestosis is a disease linked to exposure to asbestos, which was frequently used in insulation products." Id. at 730 n.43.
50. Id. at 730-31. One court that denied recovery in this case based its decision on the lack of physical injury to the plaintiff. See Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437
N.E.2d 171, 175 (Mass. 1982). Another court denied recovery based on the remoteness of the damages alleged. See Howard v. Mt. Sinai Hosp., 217 N.W.2d 383,
385 (Wis.), reh'g, 219 N.W.2d 576 (Wis. 1974). Still another court denied recovery
in a case in which the fear was claimed by a wife whose husband was at risk for
cancer. Amader v.Johns-Mansville Corp., 514 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
Notably, these courts have not based their decisions to deny the relief sought "on
the noncompensability of cancerphobia." Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 731.
51. Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 732; see Flood v. Smith, 13 A.2d 677
(Conn. 1940) (permitting recovery for fear of recurrence of breast cancer without
discussion or consideration of whether such recurrence was likely probable or possible); Walsh v. Brody, 286 A.2d 666 (Pa. Super. 1971) (allowing recovery after physician testified that plaintiff's breast was in a "precancerous" condition, although he
could not say whether or not cancer would develop); Kimbell v. Noel, 228 S.W.2d
980 (Tex. Ct. App. 1950) (same). These courts viewed the compensable injury not
as the condition that is feared, but rather as the mental anxiety with which the
plaintiff lives every day as a result of his fear. Smith v. A.C. & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854,
858 (5th Cir. 1988). However, not all judges share this view. See id. at 859 (noting
"misgivings about the wisdom of allowing recovery for cancerphobia when medical
evidence will not support a conclusion that the plaintiff has a probability of developing cancer") (jolly, J., specially concurring).
An important distinction must be drawn between claims for fear of contracting cancer (cancerphobia claims) and those for fear of a perceived increased
risk of contractingcancer. As previously stated, a plaintiff who seeks damages for his
fear of contractingcancer need not prove that his exposure to the disease will more
probably than not lead to cancer. However, this proof is required if the plaintiff
seeks to recover for his increasedrisk of contractingcancer. This Comment will not
consider cases involving claims for an increased risk of cancer. In order to more
closely parallel AIDSphobia cases, this Comment will consider only those cases in
which the plaintiff alleges a fear of contracting cancer (cancerphobia).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 6

252

VILLA-NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 241

the "reasonableness" of the fear alleged. 52 Unfortunately, the tests for de53
termining "reasonable" fears vary tremendously among jurisdictions.
Judicial acceptance of cancerphobia emotional distress claims has
spawned a variety of disease-related emotional distress claims, including
claims on the fear of contracting AIDS. While "AIDSphobia" is of recent
import, courts approach such claims with an eye trained to both general
emotional distress and cancerphobia issues. Nevertheless, due to the
unique nature of AIDS, courts struggle to determine proper standards of
proof. The next section of this Comment seeks to survey the types of adjudicated AIDSphobia claims, as well as analyze the conceptual concerns surrounding AIDSphobia cases.
III.

AIDSPHOBIA CLAIMS

Given society's current and understandable sensitivity to AIDS and its
related viruses, courts are now addressing claims arising from fear of this
relatively new, fatal and mysterious disease. 5 4 This latest trend of "phobia"
litigation may have its roots in a widely publicized 1985 lawsuit. Marc
Christian, the companion of movie star Rock Hudson, brought suit against
Hudson's estate for emotional distress he allegedly suffered as a result of
his fear. of contracting AIDS. 55 In his complaint, Christian alleged Hud52. Unfortunately for some plaintiffs, courts often disagree on what standard
of proof satisfies the "reasonableness" test. See Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 73334. For example, in Heider v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance, the Louisiana

Court of Appeals allowed the plaintiff to recover for the mental anxiety associated
with her fear of becoming an epileptic following an automobile accident, although
medical experts testified that there was only a 2-5% chance of her experiencing
future epileptic seizures. 231 So. 2d 438 (La. Ct. App. 1970). In contrast, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Ayers v. Township of Jackson, denied plaintiffs' claims for
emotional distress caused by polluted and contaminated groundwater negligently
generated by a municipal landfill. 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987). The court held that
"pain and suffering" occasioned by the emotional distress was not compensable
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act. Id. at 297.
53. For a further discussion of the standards of "reasonableness" used by
courts, see infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
54. See Lipsig, supra note 15, at 3 (tracing history of AIDSphobia cases in New
York courts). See generally Richard Carl Schoenstein, Note, Standards of Conduct,
Multiple Defendants, and Full Recovery of Damages in Tort Liability For the Transmission
of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 37, 39-42 (1989) (discussing
areas of legal decisionmaking that may be affected by AIDS, including tort liability
for transmission of HIV and possible causes of action for such negligence, and
focusing on potential negligence suits against defendants who were unaware of
their infection at time of alleged transmission of HIV to prospective plaintiffs).
55. Christian v. Sheft, No. C574153 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 1989); see Philip
Hager, Hudson AIDS Suit is Settled, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991, at B3. According to
Christian's testimony, as described in a later proceeding in the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, he and Hudson lived together at Hudson's Beverly Hills home and engaged in sexual relations for months after Hudson was diagnosed with AIDS. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft, 989 F.2d 1105, 1106 (9th
Cir. 1992). Christian's complaint charged Hudson of conspiring with his personal

secretary to conceal his illness from Christian. Hager, supra. Hudson's personal
secretary ultimately settled with Christian. Id.
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son failed to disclose his HIV status while continuing to engage in sexual
relations with Christian and, as a result, knowingly exposed Christian to
the deadly disease. 56 Although Christian tested negative nineteen times
for the presence of HIV antibodies, he nevertheless received a $5.5 million
57
settlement of his lawsuit.
Since Christian's case, numerous plaintiffs have instituted claims
under theories of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress
after sexual contact with allegedly AIDS-infected individuals. 58 In addi56. See Aetna Casualty, 989 F.2d at 1106; Hager, supra note 55, at B3.

57'. Hager, supra note 55, at B3. A Los Angeles Superior Court jury initially
found that Hudson had been responsible for "outrageous conduct" in continuing
to have a sexual relationship with Christian while not disclosing, the fact that he
carried the AIDS virus. Id. As a result, it returned a $21.75 million verdict in
Christian's favor. Id. Later, finding the award to be excessive, a superior court
judge reduced this amount to $5.5 million. Id. A state court of appeals later rejected an appeal by the estate on the ground that the $5.5 million award was "not

too large to compensate for the 'ultimate in personal horror, the fear of slow,
agonizing death.' " Id. In a further appeal to the state supreme court, attorneys
for the estate argued that the award was "far too high in view of the fact that
Christian, despite his fear of AIDS, had 19 tests, all negative." Id. Attorneys for
Christian argued that he had suffered "extraordinary" emotional distress resulting
from his reasonable fear of contracting AIDS, and that experts had advised him
that the negative test results were "no assurance that he could not eventually develop the malady." Id. At the request of both parties, the state supreme court
ultimately dropped the pending appeal from its docket and announced a settlement without divulging the dollar amount. Id.; see Settlement in Suit by Actor's Lover,
THE GAZErrE (Montreal), Aug. 30, 1991, at Cl; Lawsuit Settled with Hudson's Lover,
CALGARY HERALD,

Aug. 30, 1991, at C6.

In another aspect of the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that, since Hudson "initially misrepresented" to Christian that
he did not have AIDS, so that Christian would continue to engage in sexual relations with him, the insurance company that had underwritten Hudson's homeowner's policy was not responsible for reimbursing Hudson's estate for the
settlement with Christian. Aetna Casualty, 989 F.2d at 1108-09; see Henry Weinstein, Hudson EstateFails to Recoup AIDS Claim, L.A. TIMES, April 1, 1993, at B1. The
court said "the critical issue was 'not whether Hudson had a preconceived design
to inflict harm upon Christian,' but whether the California Superior Court would
deem Hudson's misrepresentation . . . 'inherently harmful.' " Weinstein, supra, at
BI (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Sheft, 989 F.2d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir.
1993)). The appellate court said it believed that a state court would find it harmful and stated that "while Christian consented to have sex, he did not consent to be
initially exposed to AIDS." Id.
58. See, e.g., Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991) (plaintiff was wife of hemophiliac who died from AIDS after receiving AIDS-infected
blood transfusion), aff'd, 971 F.2d 744 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2306
(1992); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(plaintiff was wife of hemophiliac who died after receiving AIDS-infected blood
product); Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554
(Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (plaintiff was homosexual lover of man who failed to
disclose previous lover's death from AIDS); Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 Idaho
App. LEXIS 53 (Idaho Ct. App. April 2, 1993) (plaintiff was wife in divorce action
who feared contracting AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases after discovering husband's extramarital affair); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(plaintiff was wife in divorce action whose AIDSphobia stemmed from husband's

failure to disclose existence of previous homosexual relationship).
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tion, plaintiffs have brought claims for AIDSphobia as a result of other
types of bodily contact with infected persons.5 9 For example, AIDSphobia
claims have arisen out of bodily contact inherent in a doctor-patient relationship. 60 Finally, some plaintiffs have alleged fear of contracting AIDS
from being pricked by a "phantom needle." 6 1
Since 1987, courts have published at least eighteen AIDSphobia decisions. The following section categorizes these cases in terms of the types
of claims brought, the types of plaintiffs who have brought the claims, the
types of defendants against which such claims have been brought, and the
success rate of plaintiffs in the applicable jurisdictions.
A.

1.

The AlDSphobia Cases

Types of Claims

Individuals seeking damages for fear of contracting AIDS frequently
sue under a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory,62 under an
intentional infliction of emotional distress theory, 63 or under both. Plaintiffs often utilize negligent infliction of emotional distress when alleging
carelessness in the defendant's actions, as evidenced by a disregard for the
64
possibility of transmitting the AIDS virus. Having an extramarital affair
59. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992)

(plaintiffs were couple who gave roadside emergency service to AIDS-infected victim of car crash); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.) (plaintiff was x-ray
technician who was bitten on arm by prison inmate), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d
1058 (N.Y. 1991);Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1991) (plaintiff was university security guard who was bitten by unruly university
hospital patient); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp., 413
S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (plaintiff was mortician who embalmed corpse infected
with AIDS virus), overruled by Courtney v. Courtney, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS (June 11,
1993).
60. See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (plaintiffs were former

patients of AIDS-infected surgeon who operated on them without disclosing his
condition); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (plaintiff was surgeon who performed two surgeries on AIDS-infected patient without
being aware of patient's condition).
61. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)

(plaintiff was railroad employee who was pricked by discarded hypodermic needle
while performing job duties); Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa.

1990) (plaintiff was paramedic who was stuck by discarded needle protruding from
used needle receptacle); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup.
Ct. 1991) (plaintiff was cleaning worker who was pricked by discarded needle while
emptying waste baskets); Carroll v.'Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No.
02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992)
(plaintiff was visitor to hospital who was stuck by needle inside used needle recep-

tacle that resembled paper towel dispenser), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (1993).
62. For a discussion of the elements which must be proved under this cause of
action, see supra note 24 and accompanying text.

63. For a discussion of the elements which must be proved under this cause of
action, see supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
64. See Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 53 (Ct. App. April 2,

1993). In Nea4 a man filed an action for divorce in the magistrate's court. Id. at
*2. His wife responded with an answer and counterclaim, asking that she be
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or in failing to be truthful with the plaintiff regarding past sexual encounters where the possibility of contracting AIDS was a concern, are examples of conduct that places a plaintiff at risk for the disease. 65 Plaintiffs
have employed an intentionalinfliction of emotional distress theory in such
actions as well, especially where a plaintiff can show willfulness in the de66
fendant's conduct.
Additionally, plaintiffs have brought claims based on a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory, alleging a specific breach of a defendant's duty. Such claims may include failure to provide a workplace safe
from exposure. 67 An alleged breach of duty may also arise in the failure of
granted the divorce and seeking damages for the emotional distress asssociated
with her fear of contracting sexually transmitted diseases due to her husband's
illicit conduct. Id. at *2-3. The magistrate transferred the matter to the district
court, which bifurcated the action and remanded to the magistrate all issues relating to the divorce, including property division, spousal support, child custody and
child support. Id. at *3. Following the district court's dismissal of Mrs. Neal's action, she appealed the decision, arguing that her emotional injury was recoverable
under the theories of negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress and
battery. Id. at *15.
65. See Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS
2554 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991). In Baranowski, the plaintiff sought prejudgment
attachment of the real estate of the defendant (his homosexual lover) to secure a
judgment sought in his complaint alleging false misrepresentation, and the negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at *2. The plaintiff
claimed that, in order to encourage and continue their homosexual relationship,
the defendant had deliberately withheld the fact that his former lover had died
from AIDS-related illnesses. Id. at *2-3. Because the court found there was probable cause to believe that the plaintiff would prevail on his emotional distress
claims at trial, it granted the prejudgment attachment. Id. at *4, 6.
66. See Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987); see also Baranowski, 1991
Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554 (homosexual man seeking recovery under intentional
infliction of emotional distress theory after lover deliberately withheld risk of AIDS
in their relationship); Nea. 1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 53 (wife seeking recovery
under intentional infliction of emotional distress theory for fear of contracting
sexually transmitted diseases following husband's extramarital affair). In Doe, a
wife who filed for divorce sought damages for the intentional infliction of emotional distress based on her husband's failure to disclose that he had a prior homosexual relationship that allegedly placed her at risk of contracting AIDS. Doe, 519
N.Y.S.2d at 599. The plaintiff's complaint stated that, because of the defendant's
failure "to disclose his homosexuality and 'at high-risk' candidacy" for AIDS, the
plaintiff suffered "severe emotional and psychological distress and potentially lifethreatening disabilities." Id. at 597. However, the court found that the plaintiff
was "trying to circumvent the dictates of equitable distribution by attempting to
obtain a money judgment for acts which are the basis for her divorce action." Id.
The court therefore granted the defendant's motion to dismiss this cause of action. Id. at 600.
67. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). In
Marchica, a railroad employee brought an action against his employer under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) after he was stuck by a discarded hypodermic needle while securing a metal grating above a window shaft in a railroad station. Id. at 446. Following the incident, the plaintiff was advised to undergo HIV
testing and to abstain from all sexual contact for at least six months. Id. Therefore, in addition to the physical injury he suffered as a result of the needle stick,
the plaintiff claimed that he was "forced to live day-to-day with the fear of con-
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a blood supplier to properly screen blood products for deadly contaminants prior to dispensation. 68 Another possible breach of duty arising
under negligent infliction of emotional distress includes the negligent design and/or manufacture of a receptacle used for discarded hypodermic
needles. 69 Finally, plaintiffs have alleged breach of duty for a defendant's
failure to disclose an individual's AIDS-infected condition, causing a plaintiff to take inadequate precautionary measures to avoid possible AIDS exposure. 70 These types of claims most often arise in the medical context
where physical contact occurring between a physician and patient exposes
71
one of them to the AIDS virus.
tracting AIDS." Id. at 449. The court interpreted this claim as one for the negligent infliction of emotional distress, "leading to post traumatic stress and
accompanying psychological difficulties ...." Id. at 449-50; see Ordway v. County
of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon bringing action against
county after performing surgery on patient without being informed by hospital of
patient's HIV status); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct.
1991) (cleaning worker bringing suit against owner of building that she cleaned
after she was accidentally stuck by discarded needle protruding from waste
container); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.) (x-ray technician suing
state for failing to properly supervise prison inmate who, after being transferred to
hospital from state correctional facility, bit plaintiff on arm, which resulted in
plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y. 1991);
Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991) (university security
officer bringing action for ADSphobia after unruly AIDS-infected hospital patient
bit him on arm).
68. See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
In Poole, the wife of a hemophiliac who contracted and died from AIDS after receiving a tainted anti-hemophilic blood factor from the defendant, sought to recover for her fear of contracting AIDS after engaging in "ordinary marital
relations" with her infected husband. Id. at 1371.
69. See Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-91 10-CV00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585
(1993). In Carrol, a visitor to a hospital sued the hospital after she mistakenly
thought that a discarded needle receptacle was a paper towel dispenser, reached
inside it and was injured by a discarded hypodermic needle. Id. at *1-2; see Burk v.
Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (paramedic stuck by needle
protruding from discarded needle receptacle sued manufacturer of container for
emotional distress suffered from fear of contracting AIDS).
70. See Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991) (family of
patient who died of AIDS after receiving tainted blood transfusion at Veterans Administration Hospital sued government for hospital's failure to inform them of patient's infected condition, resulting in wife's continued conjugal relations with her
AIDS-infected husband, thereby possibly exposing herself to AIDS virus), aff'd, 971
F.2d 744 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2306 (1992).
71. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993). In Faya, two patients of the
same physician sought recovery for their fear of contracting AIDS after they discovered that the physician was HIV-infected at the time he performed surgery on each
of them. Id. at 329. The plaintiffs argued that, had they known of the physician's
condition, they would not have consented to the surgery being performed by him.
Id. at 330. They contended that, as a result of the surgeries and their subsequent
discovery of the physician's illness, "they incurred injuries in the form of exposure
to HIV and risk of AIDS, physical injury and financial cost resulting from surveillance blood testing for HIV antibodies, pain, fear, anxiety, grief, nervous shock,
severe emotional distress, headache and sleeplessness." Id.
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Plaintiffs Who Bring A1DSphobia Claims and Defendants Who Defend the
Claims

As the previous section suggests, plaintiffs seeking recovery for their
fear of contracting AIDS generally fall into one of four categories. The
first category consists of those individuals who have had, or believe they
72
might have had, sexual contact with an HIV- or AIDS-infected person.
Individuals who have experienced non-sexual bodily contact with AIDSinfected persons constitute the second category of plaintiffs seeking AIDSphobia recovery. 73 Plaintiffs victimized by "phantom needle stick" incidents comprise the third category of plaintiffs typically bringing
AIDSphobia claims.7 4 The fourth and final category of AIDSphobic plaintiffs consists of individuals claiming that exposure to the virus occurred in
the context of medical treatment, either as a physician who unknowingly

72. See Neal v. Neal, No. 19086, 1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 53 (Idaho App. Ct.
April 2, 1993) (wife seeking counterclaim in divorce action for emotional distress
suffered from fear of contracting sexually transmitted diseases, including AIDS,
due to husband's extramarital affair); see also Diaz Reyes, 770 F. Supp. 58 (wife seeking compensation for fear of contracting AIDS after having sexual relations with
infected husband); Poole, 698 F. Supp. 1367 (same); Baranowski v. Torre, No.
CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (plaintiff
brought action against homosexual lover for AIDSphobia after lover failed to reveal that his previous lover had died of AIDS); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup.
Ct. 1987) (wife suing husband for emotional distress suffered because of his failure
to disclose prior homosexual relationship that allegedly placed wife at risk of
AIDS).
73. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (individuals who gave roadside assistance to accident victims seeking insurance coverage for their expenses and emotional distress after learning they gave aid to HIVinfected person); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.) (x-ray technician
seeking recovery for ADSphobia after being bit by infected prison inmate), appeal
denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y. 1991); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Com-

munity Hosp., 413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (mortician sought recovery for AIDSphobia after unknowingly performing embalming procedure on AIDS-infected
corpse), overruled by Courtney v. Courtney, 1993 W. Va. LEXIS 76 (W. Va. June 11,
1993); Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (1991) (security
officer seeking recovery after being bit by AIDS-infected hospital patient).
74. See Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (railroad employee stuck by needle protruding from metal grate in window of railroad
station); Burk v. Sage Prods., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (paramedic stuck by
needle protruding from receptacle for discarded needles); Castro v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (cleaning worker pricked by needle
disposed in regular waste container); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs.,
Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1992) (visitor to hospital stuck by needle inside used needle receptacle that she

mistook for paper towel dispenser), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (1993).
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treated an AIDS-infected patient 7 5 ' or as a patient who was unknowingly
7
treated by an AIDS-infected physician. ,
Thus far, the class defending AIDSPHOBIA claims reflects the limited
number of circumstances under which such claims arise. For instance,
while a number of plaintiffs have alleged AIDSphobia resulted from sexual
contact with an AIDS-infected individual,7 7 other plaintiffs, in non-sexual
scenarios, have named the allegedly infected individual as defendant in
only a limited number of cases.78 As an example, in one case, a plaintiff
brought suit against the commercial seller of a tainted blood product that

had caused her husband to become infected with the AIDS virus.7 9 In
another action, the plaintiff sued the United States government for the
actions of a veterans' hospital that allegedly gave her husband an AIDStainted blood transfusion and also failed to disclose his HIV-infected condition to her." °
Another context in which the defendants are not the alleged AIDSinfected individuals involves the situation where a hospital fails to disclose
the condition of an infected victim, resulting in a plaintiff's possible exposure to the AIDS virus."' Hospitals and their controlling governmental
75. See Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon who performed two operations on HIV-infected patient without knowledge
of patient's condition sued hospital for its failure to disclose patient's condition
before operations).
76. See Faya v. Alnaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (patients suing for fear of
contracting AIDS after learning that surgeon was HIV-positive when he performed
surgery on them).
77. For a list of cases in which plaintiffs alleged AIDSphobia resulting from
sexual contact with aids-infected individual, see supra note 72.
78. See, e.g., Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2554 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (homosexual man seeking damages from
former lover for causing him to live with fear of AIDS); Neal v. Neal, No. 19086,
1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 53 (Ct. App. April 2, 1993) (as part of divorce action, wife
bringing counterclaim for her fear of contracting sexually transmitted diseases due
to husband's extramarital affair); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (Sup. Ct. 1987)
(wife seeking damages as part of divorce action for emotional distress suffered
because of husband's failure to disclose prior homosexual relationship that allegedly placed her at risk of contracting AIDS).
79. Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. I11. 1988).
The plaintiff claimed that, as a result of the defendant's failure to perform screening and heat-treating tests on its blood products, as well as its failure to warn her
husband of the product's risks, her husband became infected with, and eventually
died from, AIDS. Id. at 1369. She further alleged that, in the "course of ordinary
marital relations, and as a result of her husband's contracting AIDS," she was "directly exposed" to the virus and suffered great emotional anguish from her fear of
contracting the virus. Id. at 1371.
80. Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991), aff'd, 971 F.2d
744 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va.
1991) (security officer alleging that, had he known of unruly patient's infected
condition, he would have taken precautionary measures so as not to become exposed to AIDS virus); Funeral Servs. by Gregory v. Bluefield Community Hosp.,
413 S.E.2d 79 (W. Va. 1991) (mortician alleging that, had hospital informed plain-
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entities have also been accused of failing to properly supervise some potentially dangerous and possibly AIDS-infected patients. This shortcoming
allegedly results in encounters placing plaintiffs at risk of contracting the
HIV virus. 82 Indeed, physicians have also sued governmental entities in
connection with a state hospital's failure to disclose the HIV-infected condition of a patient on whom surgery was performed. 83 Finally, one plaintiff named a hospital as a defendant in an AIDSphobia negligence suit for
placing a contaminated needle container too close to a wash basin and for
84
failing to place warnings on the container.
Various types of defendants have also been sued for AIDSphobia arising out of alleged "phantom needle stick" incidents. As an illustration,

some plaintiffs have brought ADSphobia claims against their employers,
claiming that the employer's negligent failure to provide a safe working
environment resulted in a "stick" by a discarded hypodermic needle, and
consequently in the plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS. 8 5 As previously
noted, other plaintiffs have brought claims that focus on a defendant's
particular use or placement of a disposal container for used hypodermic
needles. 86 Finally, some plaintiffs have brought claims as part of larger
tiff that decedent had died from AIDS, he would have taken precautionary measures during embalming procedure), overuled by Courtney v. Courtney, 1993 W. Va.
LEXIS 76 (June 11, 1993).
82. See, e.g., Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.) (x-ray technician sued
state for hospital's failure to control patient who bit plaintiff and caused him to
suffer from AIDSphobia), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y. 1991).
83. See, e.g., Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992)
(surgeon who performed two surgeries on infected patient without knowledge of
patient's infected status sued county for negligent infliction of emotional distress,
claiming he would have taken precautionary measures to ensure against exposure
to AIDS had hospital informed him of patient's condition).
84. Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-Cv00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585
(1993). The plaintiff alleged that the hospital was responsible for the negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress in its acts or omissions, including its
callous disregard for [plaintiff's] fears and sensibilities.., at the time that
she was injured, at the time that she was left waiting in the emergency
room ...

and thereafter; ...

in its failing volitionally to take any steps to

try to set her mind at ease by providing or offering to provide counselling
services and by delaying in trying to provide and/or by failing to provide
reliable information regarding whether any persons in the intensive care
unit [that day] were infected with the AIDS virus, even though [it] knew or
should have known of [her] great and justifiable fear of contracting AIDS.
Id. at *2-3.
85. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(railroad employee sued employer under FELA for emotional distress suffered af-

ter he was stuck by discarded hypodermic needle while performing job duties),

aff'd, 31 F.3d 1197 (2d Cir. 1994); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d
695 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (cleaning worker sued owner of building, with which her
cleaning service contracted, after she was stuck by discarded hypodermic needle
while emptying waste container).
86. See, e.g., Carroll,1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (visitor to hospital who was
stuck by needle inside needle container claiming hospital was negligent in its
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products liability
actions against the manufacturer of the disposed needle
87
receptacles.
Physicians have also been named defendants in AIDSphobia actions.
In these cases, plaintiffs generally contend that the physician was negligent
in performing invasive surgeries with the knowledge of physician-HIV-infection, and/or in failing to inform the patient of the infected condition
88
as part of obtaining the patient's consent prior to surgery.
3.

Success Rates of Plaintiffs in Applicable Jurisdictions

Because AIDSphobia tort claims remain relatively novel, few state or
federal courts have adjudicated this evolving cause of action. Resulting in
five published opinions, courts in the state of New York have addressed
the subject on the greatest number of occasions. 8 9 Nevertheless, until the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York decided
Marchica v. Long Island Railroad, a plaintiff's chance of achieving success
on an AIDSphobia claim in New York seemed remote. 90 Even in the
Marchica decision, the plaintiff was not entirely successful in that no
money damages were awarded. 9 1
placement of container close to wash basin, arguing that it resembled paper towel
dispenser).

87. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(paramedic suing manufacturer of used needle container after he was stuck by
protruding needle).
88. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993) (patients of surgeon, who

performed surgery on them with knowledge that he was HIV-positive, suing for
their fear of contracting AIDS from possible exposure to physician's blood during
invasive surgical procedure).
89. See Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Hare
v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 1058 (N.Y. 1991);
Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 .(Sup. Ct. 1987).
90. See, e.g., Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17 (awarding summaryjudgment to
defendant because plaintiff tested negative for AIDS and no unusual circumstances occurred during operations that plaintiff performed on AIDS-infected patient in that there was no broken glove or pierced skin, which indicated lack of
genuineness of plaintiff's claim); Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (denying recovery because plaintiff tested negative for AIDS, even though plaintiff suffered from weight
loss and other symptoms); Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 598 (denying recovery to wife
whose husband had homosexual adulterous relationship because there was no

proof that he had AIDS and connection was too tenuous).
91. See Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 453 (concluding jury is to determine whether
compensable injury occurred and remanding rather than awarding damages). In
Marchica, the defendant-railroad moved for partial summary judgment and asked
the court to dismiss all claims relating to the plaintiff's AIDSphobia claim. Id. at
447. The defendant argued that there was no proof that the plaintiff was exposed
to the AIDS virus, especially because all HIV tests had produced negative results.
Id. The plaintiff counter-argued that, under FELA, railroad workers may assert
claims for "wholly mental" injuries and that the defendant had a heavy burden to
overcome in its attempt to prevail in its motion for summary judgment. Id. at 448.
The court explained that, "whether [plaintiff's] psychological history since this incident constitutes compensable damage ... is a material question of fact for the
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Survival of a defendant's motion to dismiss persists as a portentous
obstacle in the path towards recovery. Note that only one court in West
Virginia has awarded a plaintiff ultimate monetary recovery. 92 Aside from
New York and West Virginia, no other jurisdiction has published more
than one opinion determining the viability of an AIDSphobia claim. In

93
fact, only eight additional courts have even heard AIDSphobia claims.

Thus far, "success" in any of these jurisdictions, has meant surviving or
overturning on appeal the defendant's motion to dismiss. Measured in
this manner, only five AIDSphobia plaintiffs have been successful. 9 4 In
addition, the plaintiff in Baranowski v. Tore95 achieved some degree of
victory in an award of a prejudgment attachment on defendant's real estate pending the outcome of a trial on the merits. 96
jury." Id. at 453. In concluding that summary judgment was not appropriate in
this case, the court added that
[i]
n this type of case, the finder of fact may conclude that the plaintiff has
sustained sufficient physical injury to support an award for mental
anguish, even if subsequent medical diagnosis fails to reveal any other
physical injury, and even though there is no proof at this time that the
plaintiff has, in fact, contracted AIDS.
Id. Thus, the court remanded this case, instead of awarding money damages. Id.
92. SeeJohnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va.
1991). The Johnson court affirmed a jury award for the plaintiff of $2 million,
which had been reduced by the trial court to $1.9 million due to the plaintiff's
contributory negligence. Id.
93. See Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D. Ill. 1988);
Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Transamerica Ins. Co.
v.Doe, 840 P.2d 288 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV900236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991); Neal v.
Neal, No. 19086, 1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 53 (Ct. App. April 2, 1993), amended,
1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 59 (April 26, 1993), opinion withdrawn, substituted opinion,
1993 Idaho App. LEXIS 98 (June 29, 1993); Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md.
1993); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992).
94. See Marchica, 810 F. Supp. at 453 (concluding that because jury could find

that railroad acted negligently toward plaintiff and played role in causing his injuries, defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied); Faya,620 A.2d
at 338 (holding that trial court erred in dismissing patients' negligence claims
against physician and finding that patients alleged facts which, if proven, "indicate
that [surgeon] may have breached a legal duty, thereby causing them to suffer legally compensable injuries"); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695,
698 (Sup. Ct. 1991), 588 N.Y.S.2d at 698 (finding a basis to guarantee genuineness

of plaintiff's AIDSphobia claim, court denied defendant's motion to dismiss complaint on grounds that it failed to state cause of action); Carroll 1992 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 845 at *13 (reversing trial court's grant of summary judgment in defendant's favor upon finding that disputed issue of material fact existed as to whether
plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS was reasonable).
95. No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8,

1991).
96. Id. (holding that probable cause existed to support each element of plaintiff's emotional distress claim at trial and therefore, prejudgment attachment was
proper).
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Problems of Proof

Four issues commonly arise in "phobia" litigation: (1) whether the
plaintiff has been exposed to the disease; (2) whether the plaintiff has
suffered physical injury; (3) whether the plaintiff's fear of contracting the
disease in the future is reasonable; and (4) whether the plaintiff has
proved the elements of a negligence claim, when utilizing a negligent infliction of emotional distress theory. This Comment explores each issue
individually, as it has been raised in AIDSphobia cases, and attempts to
explain the often varied interpretations among the courts. Moreover,
each section suggests workable limits within which courts may resolve
these issues.
1. ProvingExposure to the Disease
At the outset, the unique nature and manifestations of the disease
serve as tremendous barriers to recovery for damages in a fear of contracting AIDS claim. 9 7 The lengthy "latency" or incubation period, during
which the AIDS virus lies dormant in its victims, may be responsible for
this lack of success in the courts. 9 8 Other diseases marked by similar latency periods have, however, formed the basis of fruitful phobia litigation. 99 To adjudicate claims based on a plaintiff's fear of contracting
diseases with such latency periods, many courts rely on the "discovery
97. See Schoenstein, Note, supra note 54, at 42. This commentator has
argued:
The road from HIV infection to the development of AIDS has an unknown, but potentially lengthy, incubation period during which the infected party may not know that he or she has the disease, although the
virus can still be transmitted to other persons. The incubation period
presents problems in tracing the source of the infection, demonstrating
the source's negligence, and proving that the victim was not participating
in high risk conduct.
Id.; see Bernard M. Dickens, Legal Rights and Duties in the AIDS Epidemic, 239 Sci.
580, 583 (1988) (explaining that "[t]he long incubation period of AIDS may obstruct the tracing of an alleged source and make it difficult to establish that party's
wrongful nondisclosure or failure to follow prudent sexual behavior, or the plaintiff's seronegativity prior to the sexual encounter and low-risk conduct
thereafter").
98. See Association of State and Territorial Public Health Laboratory Directors
and AIDS Program, et al., Interpretation and Use of the Western Beat Assay for Serodiagnosis of Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type Infections, 38 MORBIDn' AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., No. 5-7, July 21, 1989, at 5 (noting that although latency
period between infection with HIV and onset of AIDS may be lengthy, majority of
HIV carriers test positive for virus within six months of acquiring it).
99. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop., 664 P.2d 474 (Wash. 1983)
(noting 14% reduction in plaintiff's chance of survival was sufficient to allow proximate cause issue to go to jury); see also Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 723 (reporting that long dormancy period of latent diseases like cancer causes plaintiffs
problems when seeking recovery for exposure to carcinogens).
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rule." 10 0 This rule states that the plaintiff may bring his cause of action
when he knows, or has reason to know that the defendant's negligence has
caused him injury. 10 1 In such a case, the statute of limitations on a cause
of action does not begin to run until symptoms of the disease become
manifest, or should have become manifest if the plaintiff took reasonable
notice. 10 2 The effect of the "discovery rule" in phobia cases is to postpone
disdiscussion of, and therefore recovery for, many plaintiffs' emotional
03
tress claims until symptoms of the disease become apparent.'
Nevertheless, some courts have allowed plaintiffs to recover for their
present fear of contracting a disease marked by such an incubation period. 10 4 These courts allow recovery on the presumption of compensation
for the present injury from which the plaintiff suffers-which is his or her
fear of future disease. 10 5 Very often in these cases, however, the courts
find recovery is appropriate because the plaintiff's exposure to an agent
causing the potential disease is not at issue. 10 6 Thus, courts determine the
suitability of the plaintiff's recovery based on one or both of the following
100. See, e.g., Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 292 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1992) (following "discovery rule"); Burns v.Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 31
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (same), review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (1989).
101. See Seymour v. Lofgreen, 495 P.2d 969, 975 (Kan. 1972) (noting that
"belated discovery provision" was intended to apply to situations in which injury
was of such nature that it could not reasonably be ascertained until sometime after
commission of act that caused it); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 30, at 16668 (discussing origin of discovery rule in medical malpractice arena and subsequent use in other areas involving dentists, accountants, architects, lawyers and
manufacturers of defective products).
102. KEETON ET AL., supra note 20, § 30, at 166-68; see Rodriguez v. Niemeyer,
595 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (recognizing that under discovery
rule, limitations period begins to run when party discovers injury or in exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered injury).
103. Although the discussion of a plaintiff's emotional distress claim is postponed in jurisdictions using the "discovery rule," a plaintiff is not foreclosed from
bringing a possible future lawsuit seeking recovery for fear of disease. See Transamerica, 840 P.2d at 292 (refusing to foreclose future suit if claimants contract virus
because use of "discovery rule" means statute of limitations does not begin to run
until disease or physical injury becomes manifest); Burns, 752 P.2d at 31 (stating
that neither single controversy rule nor statute of limitations precludes timely filed
cause of action for damages resulting from future discovery of disease related to
exposure to toxic substance, despite prior litigation between parties on different
claims based on same tortious conduct).
104. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287-88 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (discussing jurisdictions that allow recovery for fear of contracting disease
that involves latency or incubation period).
105. See generally Gale & Goyer, supra note 28, at 729-36 (describing reasonable fear as basis of damages for mental suffering and recovery for fear in specific
case of "cancerphobia").
106. See Herber v.Johns-Manville Corp., 785 F.2d 79, 85 (3d Cir. 1986) (permitting recovery for fear of cancer or asbestosis after exposure to asbestos fibers);
Jackson v.Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 414-15 (5th Cir.) (same), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219,
1228 (D. Mass. 1986) (permitting recovery once plaintiff proved exposure to artificial environmental hazards).
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issues: Whether the plaintiff has in fact been exposed to the disease and
107
whether the plaintiff will contract the disease in the future.
Most courts agree that a plaintiff must prove exposure to a diseasecausing agent before allowing recovery, but many courts require proof of
exposure only as an "initial" threshold; the plaintiff must then satisfy additional requirements. For example, courts have required not only that the
plaintiff prove that he or she was exposed to the disease, but also that he
or she has suffered some physical injury causally linked to such exposure.10 8 In this regard, courts distinguish between plaintiffs whose physiIn the context of AIDS, where exposure to the disease is not at issue, the court
may uphold the plaintiffs' claims for AIDSphobia. SeeJohnson v. West Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893 (W. Va. 1991) (finding there was adequate exposure to disease where AIDS-infected patient bit himself first, and then, with blood
in and around his mouth, bit plaintiff, breaking skin and causing plaintiff to
bleed); Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2554,
at *5 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (finding adequate exposure to disease where AIDSinfected man caused plaintiff to continue sexual relations without knowledge that
infected man's previous lover had died from AIDS). But see Burns v. Jaquays Mining Corp., 752 P.2d 28, 30 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing no damages for fear of
contracting asbestos-related diseases even though asbestos fibers present in plaintiffs' lungs), review dismissed, 781 P.2d 1373 (Ariz. 1989); DeStories v. Phoenix, 744
P.2d 705, 710-11 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
107. See, e.g., Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287-88 (discussing plaintiff's admission
that he could not demonstrate that needle that pricked him was used previously on
AIDS-infected patient). The Burk court explained:
Plaintiff's position is in marked contrast to the other situations where
recovery for fear of contracting a disease has been held compensable, in
that plaintiff in this case is unable to demonstrate an exposure to a disease-causing agent. The cases which have allowed recovery for fear of
disease have done so when the plaintiffs were faced only with the question
of whether they would contract the disease in the future; the plaintiffin the
instant case faces the additional question of whether he has been exposed to the
AIDS virus in the first place.
Id. at 287 (emphasis added). The court went on to state that it was unable to
locate any case from any jurisdiction that had permitted recovery for the plaintiff's
fear of contracting a disease when the plaintiff could not prove that he had been
exposed to a disease-causing agent. Id.
108. See, e.g., id. at 288 n.2 (plaintiff's injury, laceration to hand by hypodermic needle that he could not show was used on AIDS patient, indicated exposure
only to hypodermic needle, not AIDS); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F.
Supp. 1367, 1371-72 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff directly exposed to AIDS virus
through sexual relations with infected husband, but denied recovery because of
failure to allege physical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (plaintiffs exposed
to AIDS-infected blood while rendering cardiopulmonary resuscitation and other
life-sustaining measures, but denied recovery on insurance policy for "bodily injury" because offered no evidence of physical impairment or harm caused by exposure); Cathcart v. Keene Indus. Insulation, 471 A.2d 493, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(plaintiff's fear of contracting cancer denied by court because she had not
pleaded sufficient physical injury resulting from exposure to cancer-causing
agent). In Cathcart,the court stated that "until [the plaintiff] is able to allege some
physical injury or some medically-identifiable effect linked to her exposure to asbestos
particles, her claim . . . is not legally cognizable." Id. (emphasis added); see Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming grant
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cal injury stems from fear of disease after exposure to a disease-causing
10 9
agent, and those whose injury stems solely from fear of an initialexposure.
Additionally, courts occasionally demand that plaintiffs prove other requirements, including proof that the fear alleged was reasonable, 11 0 or
that the defendant breached his or her duty to inform of the disease car1 11
rier's infected status.
The unique characteristics of AIDS and the existing technology available to detect the HIV virus have greatly facilitated the court's task of determining the occurrence of exposure. Specifically, exposure to AIDS is
presently known to transpire in only a limited number of circumstances. 112 Transmission of HIV ensues primarily from an exchange of
body fluids, especially blood and semen. 113 These fluids are exchanged
most frequently through sexual activity, hypodermic needle use and inof summary judgment against cancerphobia claim brought by wives and children
of men who allegedly carried asbestos dust into home on clothing and tools, despite fact that emotional distress allegedly suffered caused plaintiffs to suffer headaches). In Wisniewski, the court relied on the Cathcart language requiring a
"linkage" between injury and exposure, and dismissed the action because the
plaintiffs "alleged no injuries that stem[med] from exposure to the asbestos itself." Wisniewski, 759 F.2d at 274 (emphasis added). But see Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *1112 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) (concluding that plaintiff's injury, laceration to hand
by hypodermic needle, indicated exposure to both hypodermic needle and AIDS,
given medical profession's assumption that all used needles are contaminated with
AIDS virus). For a further discussion of the physical injury requirement, see infra
notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
109. Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287. The court in Burk stated that: "[W] hile injuries
stemming from a fear of contracting illness after exposure to a disease-causing
agent may present compensable damages, injuries stemming from fear of the initial exposure do not." Id.
110. See, e.g., Carroll, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *13 (reversing lower
court's grant of summaryjudgment in defendant's favor because disputed issue of
material fact existed as to whether plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS was reasonable);Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 894 (W. Va. 1991)
(imposing requirement of exposure plus reasonablefear because fact that plaintiff
was actually exposed to AIDS virus goes to reasonableness of fear). For a further
discussion of the requirement that the fear be "reasonable," see infra notes 148-54
and accompanying text.
111. See Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58, 63 (D.P.R. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on ground that law did not recognize duty to violate doctor-patient relationship by informing family members that patient contracted AIDS). For a further
discussion of the "duty to inform" issue in AIDSphobia litigation, see infra notes
160-72 and accompanying text.

112.

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME

13-14 (1986) (stating that no known risk of contracting AIDS exists from casual
contact); see Schoenstein, supra note 54, at 44-45 (stating that "[AIDS] virus is most
commonly transmitted through anal intercourse or intravenous drug use").
113. See Robert M. Swenson, Plagues, History, and AIDS, AM. SCHOLAR, Spring
1988, at 183, 192. HIV has also been detected in breast milk and vaginal secretions
"in smaller, but significant" numbers. Id.
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114
Consequently, the limtrauterine contact between mother and fetus.
ited number of documented ways of contracting HIV disadvantages
plaintiffs who allege exposure to the virus through more indirect
1 15
means.
Notwithstanding the disease's unique character and the relatively limited modes of transmission, a court's determination of whether exposure
1 16
has occurred is facilitated by tests detecting the AIDS virus' presence.
Such tests frequently provide courts with sufficient legal proof that actual
1 17
Because medical personexposure to the disease simply did not occur.
nel can now ascertain fairly accurately whether someone is infected with
the HIV virus, the fact that a plaintiff has tested negatively for the virus
18
often renders his claim of AIDSphobia suspect.'

114. For a thorough discussion of the methods of HIV transmission, see
Schoenstein, supra note 54, at 37-49.
115. See Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327 (Md. 1993).
116. Two tests have been developed to determine whether someone has become infected with the AIDS virus. The Enzymelinked Immunosorben Assay
(ELISA) test determines whether HIV antibodies are present in the individual's
bloodstream. See Schoenstein, supra note 54, at 48 (citing WILLIAM H. MASTERS ET
AL., CRISIS: HETEROSEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE AGE OF AIDS 15, 42 (1988) and

Deborah M. Barnes, New Questions About AIDS Test Accuracy, 238 Sci. 884, 884-85
(1987)). The presence of such antibodies in the bloodstream indicates that the
individual may be infected with HIV. Deborah M. Barnes, New Questions About
AIDS Test Accuracy, 238 Sci. 884, 884 (1987). However, estimates indicate that as
many as 90% of those who test positive for antibodies are not actually infected with
HIV. Id. This type of test result is called a "false positive." Id. at 885.
A second test, the Western blot test, is performed once antibodies are found
to be present in two ELISA tests. Id. This test is problematic for two reasons.
Schoenstein, supra note 54, at 48. First, an increasing number of inexperienced
commercial laboratories are performing tests and possibly reducing accuracy. Id.
Second, confusion exists as to specific criteria that denotes a positive test result. Id.
However, the combination of these two tests "can achieve an accuracy level in excess of 99 percent." Id.
117. SeeBurkv. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (denying recovery to plaintiff for emotional distress because plaintiff could not prove
needle that pricked him was used on AIDS patient and tested negative for AIDS);
Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (denying
recovery for fear of contracting AIDS from AIDS patient on which plaintiff operated because no unusual circumstances surrounding operation and plaintiff tested
negative); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991) (denying recovery
to plaintiff who lost weight and exhibited cold symptoms after being bitten by inmate because plaintiff tested negative several times for AIDS and there was no
proof inmate had AIDS).
118. See, e.g., Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58, 59, 63 (D.P.R. 1991)
(precluding recovery after plaintiff tested negative for HIV virus although plaintiff
suffered from anxiety that she would test positive in future), aff'd, 971 F.2d 744
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2306 (1992); Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 288 (precluding
recovery after plaintiff tested negative five times within one year, although plaintiff
claimed that he might still contract AIDS in future); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe,
840 P.2d 288, 288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (precluding recovery on insurance policy after plaintiffs tested negative to virus after undergoing year of tests, and doctor
stated that further testing was unnecessary); Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017 (precluding recovery after plaintiff tested negative); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588
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Interestingly, however, some jurisdictions have not required the strict
rule of exposure that is required by other courts. 119 These courts reflect
the view that the plaintiff must prove only that his or her fear of contracting the disease is reasonable. 120 The Tennessee Court of Appeals expressed this view in Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services. 121 In

Carroll, the plaintiff brought suit against a hospital after she was accidentally stuck by a discarded hypodermic needle. 122 The plaintiff alleged that
the hospital was guilty of negligent, intentional and/or reckless infliction
of emotional distress. 123 Even though the plaintiff could not prove that
she had been exposed to the AIDS virus, the court held that a disputed
issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's fear of AIDS was
reasonable. 12 4 It therefore reversed the lower court's granting of sumN.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (precluding recovery after plaintiff underwent
testing at least twice but would not reveal results); Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 127 (precluding recovery after plaintiff tested negative several times). But see Carroll Sisters
of St. Francis Health Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 845 at *5, *13 (Ct. App. Oct. 12, 1992) (precluding defendant's summary
judgment motion after plaintiff tested negatively for almost three years after alleged exposure), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (1993);Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 891-92, 897 (W. Va. 1991) (awarding $1.9 million though
plaintiff regularly tested negative for AIDS).
119. See Carroll; 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *10 (focusing instead on reasonableness of plaintiff's fear); Laxton v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 639 S.W.2d
431, 434 (Tenn. 1982) (same). On the other hand, the Pennsylvania and West

Virginia courts have employed a strict exposure rule. See, e.g., Burk, 747 F. Supp. at
288 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff could
not prove exposure to AIDS virus); Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 894 (holding that before
recovery for emotional distress damages may be recovered, there must be proof of

exposure to disease).
120. See Laxton, 639 S.W.2d at 434. The court in Laxton, rather than requiring
proof of exposure and resulting physical injury to the plaintiff, required only that

the plaintiff's fear be reasonable. Id. at 433.
121. Carroll 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *10. The Carrollcourt reversed
the lower court's granting of summary judgment to the defendant and found that
a disputed issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS was reasonable. Id. at *14. The dissent, however, argued that the

exposure requirement was still necessary.
There is no proof that the plaintiff herein was ever exposed to the AIDS
virus. Tests were performed on the plaintiff for a period of nearly three
years after the event, and all proved negative. The unsubstantiatedfear that
one may have been exposed to the AIDS virus is not a sufficient basis under
our authorities to support a claim for emotional distress.
Id. at *18 (Highers, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
122. Id. at *1-2.
123. Id. at *2. The plaintiff claimed that the hospital's liability arose out of its
"callous disregard" for her fears and sensibilities when she was injured and thereafter, and its failure to determine whether any AIDS-infected patients were being
treated in the area of the hospital in which she was injured. Id. at *2-3.
124. Id. at *14. To support its decision, the court acknowledged that the
plaintiff's body had been invaded by "contaminated needles." Id. at *13. Particularly persuasive to the court was evidence that the medical profession presumes all
discarded needles to be infected with the AIDS virus. Id. at *12-13.
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mary judgment. 125 The Carrollcourt followed the reasoning of the court
in Laxton v. Orkin ExterminatingCo., 12 6 by requiring only that the plaintiff's
12 7
fear be reasonable.
Notwithstanding the jurisdiction that merely requires a reasonable
fear of contracting AIDS, proving exposure to HIV is an important hurdle
that ADSphobic plaintiffs must clear to survive a defendant's motion to
dismiss. This hurdle is not, however, unique to ADSphobia plaintiffs. All
plaintiffs alleging emotional distress due to the fear of contracting a future
disease must prove exposure to a disease-causing agent before allegations
of emotional distress will be considered even remotely compensable. The
particular difficulties encountered by AIDSphobic plaintiffs, including the
limited methods of HIV transmission, the tests available to detect HIV antibodies in the bloodstream as early as six months after exposure and society's stigmatization of AIDS, are addressed by both courts and
commentators each time an AIDSphobia claim arises.
2.

Physical Injury and Impact Requirements

As discussed earlier in the
courts have developed physical
determining which claims are
function basically as "screening

context of emotional distress claims, most
injury and impact requirements to aid in
genuine. 128 As such, these requirements
devices." 129 While all courts today do not

125. Id. The trial court's reason for granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment was that the plaintiff could not prove that the needle that had
stuck her was indeed contaminated with the AIDS virus. Id. at *13.
126. 639 S.W.2d 431 (Tenn. 1982). In Laxton, the plaintiffs sued for the negligent infliction of mental anguish after the defendants sprayed the area around
their home with a chemical designed to kill subterranean termites, thereby contaminating their water supply. Id. at 431-32. The plaintiffs ingested the water for
months before learning of its chemical contamination. Id. at 432. Although the
plaintiffs could not demonstrate any deterioration in their health due to the defendant's negligence, the court awarded them damages for their fear of contracting serious health problems. Id. at 434. The court reasoned that ingestion of
an indefinite amount of a harmful substance constituted sufficient physical injury
to support an award even though subsequent medical diagnoses did not reveal any

other physical injuries. Id.
127. Id. ("Even though the tests [for cancer] proved negative, in our opinion a
jury could find sufficient 'injury' to these plaintiffs to justify a recovery for their
natural concern and anxiety for the welfare of themselves and of their infant chil-

dren.") (emphasis added).
128. See Davies, supra note 28, at 7 ("Most jurisdictions recognize a cause of
action for mental distress for persons who have suffered some type of 'impact,' or
who were in the 'zone of danger' of bodily harm.").
129. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 818 (Cal. 1980) (stating that primary justification for physical injury requirement is that it serves as

screening device to limit risk of feigned injuries and false claims). Physical harm is
considered "susceptible of objective ascertainment and hence to corroborate the
authenticity of the claim." Id.; see Davies, supra note 28, at 8. The physical impact
and zone of danger rules further policy goals that are similar to those underlying
the physical injury requirement: They restrict the number of potential plaintiffs,
facilitate the courts' selection of genuine claims and require a literal "physical
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demand these requirements in traditional emotional distress cases, they
generally do require that physical manifestations of the feared disease be
shown in phobia cases.130 Conscious of the requirement to show some
physical injury accompanied their emotional distress, many AIDSphobic
plaintiffs allege some type of physical injury that either caused their fear of
131
AIDS or resulted from this fear.
While valid justifications for these requirements exist, some courts
and authorities have addressed the difficulties inherent in rigid adherence
to such criteria. 13 2 For example, the physical injury and impact standards
may impose artificial barriers to recovery. 133 In addition, other methods
zone" in which bodily harm would have been possible. Davies, supra, note 28, at 8-

9.
130. For a discussion of the decline of these requirements in traditional emotional distress cases, see Davies, supra note 28.
131. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 287 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(alleging fear of AIDS from needle stick caused loss of all sexual function); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (alleging bodily
injury and damages, including anxiety and enotional distress from exposure to
HIV-infected blood); Baranowski v. Torre, No. CV90-0236178, 1991 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2554, at *2 (Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1991) (seeking treatment for mental ailments and variety of physical complaints, including weight loss, chest pains, general fatigue, thrush and skin lesions); Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588
N.Y.S.2d 695, 696 (Sup. Ct. 1991) (alleging that needle puncture wound to right
thumb resulted in need to undergo diagnostic testing, generalized anxiety disorder, variety of medical problems, including headaches, depression, nightmares
and sleeplessness); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (App. Div. 1991) (alleging
bite by patient rumored to have AIDS in addition to weight loss and various cold
symptoms); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595, 597 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (alleging severe
emotional and psychological distress, potentially life-threatening disabilities, pain
and suffering, severe traumatic neurosis manifested by depression, anxiety, obsessional symptoms and severe AIDSphobia, including crying spells, sleeplessness,
nervousness, paranoia and rage); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs.,
Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845,'at *3 (Ct. App. Oct.
12, 1992) (alleging painful pricks to fingers causing swelling, in addition to anxiety, fear, and emotional distress resulting in loss of enjoyment of life); Johnson v.
West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 892 (W. Va. 1991) (alleging that bite
on arm, sleeplessness, loss of appetite and other physical manifestations accompanied emotional distress). But see, Diaz Reyes v. United States, 770 F. Supp. 58, 5960 (D.P.R. 1991) (failing to allege any physical injury), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2306
(1992); Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(alleging that only "tremendous and excruciating emotional anguish" was caused
by fear of contracting AIDS); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017
(Sup. Ct. 1992) (alleging only general averment of livingin "fear and uncertainty"
and continual belief of being contaminated by AIDS virus).
132. See, e.g., Molien, 616 P.2d at 819 ("In no other area are the vagaries of our
law more apparent than in the distinction between mental and emotional distress
accompaniedby physical manifestation and such discomfort unaccompaniedby physical manifestation." (quoting Allen v. Jones, 104 Cal. App. 3d 207, 216 (Ct. App.
1980) (Gardner, J.,concurring) (emphasis added))).

133. See Molien, 616 P.2d at 818 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL, PROSSER AND
§ 54, at 328 (4th ed. 1971)). As Dean Prosser has

KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS

explained:
Not only fright and shock, but other kinds of mental injury are marked by
definite physical symptoms, which are capable of clear medical proof. It
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might be utilized that are more rationally linked to assurances of genuine34
ness in a plaintiff's phobia claim.'
Difficulties commonly arise in distinguishing purely physical and purely
psychological injuries.13 5 As early as 1896, courts considered this issue 1 in
36
other contexts. For example, in Sloane v. Southern California Railway Co.,
the California Supreme Court noted mental suffering "constitutes an aggravation of damages when it naturally ensues from the act complained
of." 137 Next, the Sloane court considered whether a nervous disorder was a
purely physical or mental injury:
The interdependence of the mind and body is... so close that it
is impossible to distinguish their respective influence upon each
other.... [A] disturbance of the nervous system, is distinct from
mental anguish, and falls within the physiological, rather than
the psychological.... [However] an exposure to imminent peril,
has produced in individuals a complete change in their nervous
system, and rendered one who was. physically strong and vigorous
is entirely possible to allow recovery only upon satisfactory evidence and
deny it when there is nothing to corroborate the claim, or to look for
some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. The
problem is one of proof and it will not be necessary to deny a remedy in
all cases because some claims may be false.
KEETON ET A., supra note 20, § 54, at 328 (emphasis added).
134. See Molien, 616 P.2d at 819 (stating that physical injury provides one guarconcurring). In addition, plaintiffs who state
antee of genuineness.) (Gardner, J.,
an independent cause of action, other than for emotional distress, may convince
courts that their pain is genuine. Id. (Gardner, J., concurring). The "genuineness" of a plaintiff's phobia claim may also be guaranteed where a plaintiff seeks
damages for emotional distress caused by the defendant's "extreme and outrageous intentional invasions of one's mental and emotional tranquility." Id. (Gardner, J., concurring) (citing Alcorn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216, 218 (Cal.
1970)).
135. The difficulty courts have in characterizing injury is seen in decisions in
which the injury alleged was the physical invasion of the plaintiff's body during the
HIV testing process. See, e.g., Transamerica,840 P.2d at 292. In Transamerica, the
court interpreted recovery for "bodily injury" under an insurance policy and
stated:
[This court] could conclude that diagnostic testing, utilized to determine
whether bodily injury occurred, is itself bodily injury only by extending
the meaning of "bodily injury" far beyond its accepted bounds. Such a
conclusion would invite the very inequities to both plaintiffs and defendants that we avoid by requiring manifestation of bodily injury, rather than
exposure to a threat of future injury, to support a claim for damages resulting from bodily injury. We therefore decline to expand the meaning
of "bodily injury" to encompass common diagnostic testing intended to
determine whether bodily injury occurred.
Id. However, the court went on to state that a plaintiff may recover damages for
the costs of medical testing and surveillance that is reasonably necessary for the
diagnosis and treatment of latent injuries or disease. Id.
136. 44 P. 320 (Cal. 1896).
137. Id. at 322. The Sloane court acknowledged that a mental disturbance
alone would not guarantee a plaintiff's recovery. Id.
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weak and timid. Such a result must be regarded as an injury to
the body.., even though the mind be at the same time injuri1 38
ously affected.
Although medical knowledge, science and technology have greatly
progressed since Sloane, the decision's underlying principles-that emotional distress damages are relegated to the status of "parasitic" damages
and that mental disturbances can be classified as either psychological or
physical-"still pervade the law of negligence."1 39 Finally, the difficulty in
distinguishing physical and psychological injuries is most apparent in cases
where the same physical symptoms are alleged by separate plaintiffs and
140
the courts reach different outcomes as to each plaintiff.
Courts adjudicating AIDSphobia claims are often faced with plaintiffs
alleging somewhat unusual types of physical injury. For example, the types
of physical injury that AIDSphobic plaintiffs have alleged include human
bites and the previously mentioned needle pricks. 141 In some cases, plaintiffs are denied recovery for fear of disease but are compensated for physical injuries. 14 2 In other cases, courts have not found a sufficient causal
connection between the physical injury and exposure. 143 Fortunately,
some courts are willing to substitute other methods that effectively test the
138. Id.
139. 616 P.2d 813, 817 (Cal. 1980).
140. Compare Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126-27 (App. Div. 1991) (alleging human bite as physical injury sufficient to cause fear of AIDS but not recovering for AIDSphobia) with Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889,
891, 897 (W. Va. 1991) (alleging human bites as physical injury sufficient to cause
fear of AIDS and recovering for AIDSphobia). Courts have taken differing views
on claims that allege physical injury accompanied by emotional distress. Compare
Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286,. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (alleging
needle prick as physical injury accompanying emotional distress but not given
chance to recover) with Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698
(Sup. Ct. 1991) (alleging needle prick as physical injury accompanying emotional
distress and recovering for AIDSphobia) and Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health
Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *3, *14 (Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 1992) (same), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d. 585 (1993).
141. See, e.g., Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 286 (alleging needle prick as physical injury
accompanying emotional distress); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288,
291-92 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (alleging physical invasion of body during HIV testing); Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 696 (alleging needle prick as physical injury accompanying emotional distress); Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126 (alleging human bite as
physical injury sufficient to cause fear of AIDS); Carrol 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS
845, at *3 (alleging needle prick as physical injury accompanying emotional distress); Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 891-92(alleging human bite as physical injury sufficient to cause fear of AIDS).
142. See, e.g., Hare, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 126 (claimant x-ray technician recovered
for pain and suffering caused by bites of inmate but did not recover for emotional
distress suffered because of fear of contracting AIDS).
143. See Burk, 747 F. Supp. at 287-88 (discussing "linkage" requirement between exposure and physical injury).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994

31

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 6

272

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39: p. 241

genuineness of a plaintiff's fear. 144 Still other jurisdictions simply allow
145
recovery regardless of whether physical injury exists.,
Given the current AIDS hysteria consuming the American public,
courts should question whether the physical injury requirement realistically serves valid policy considerations in limiting AIDSphobia claims.
While many claims for ADSphobia may not be valid, some claims may be
legally justified, even when the plaintiff proves no physical injury or impact. More emphasis should be placed on the circumstances surrounding
the alleged exposure to AIDS, rather than on the resulting physical harm
caused by the exposure. A close examination of the specific facts surrounding a plaintiff's possible AIDS exposure will assist a court in assessing the validity of the claim. Moreover, such scrutiny will also help ensure
fraudulent claims are not compensated merely because the plaintiff alleges impressive or sympathy-inspiring physical symptoms.
3.

Determining the Reasonableness of the Fear

The distinctiveness of AIDS as a highly contagious, fatal disease with
no known cure, could foreseeably justify all plaintiffs' fears as reasonable.
Indeed, this prospect may terrify courts, and rightfully so, given the potentially unlimited number of AIDSphobia cases plaintiffs might bring. While
the nature of the disease and its recent emergence into the American conscience should not serve to rationalize every claim for AIDSphobia, courts
should not, however, be influenced by these social realities in unfairly denying worthy plaintiffs of their day in court. Frequently, the question of
"reasonableness" of the plaintiff's fear of AIDS arises in conjunction with
the question of a plaintiff's actual exposure to the disease. 1 46 As a result,
the circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's alleged exposure may often
factor into ajury's conclusion as to whether the plaintiff's fear was reason14 7
able at all.
144. See Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 616 P.2d 813, 816-17 (Cal. 1980)
(allowing recovery through use of "foreseeability" test despite lack of physical in-

jury); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509, 520 (Haw. 1970) (applying "reasonable
man" standard).
145. See, e.g., Smith v. A.C. & S., Inc., 843 F.2d 854, 858 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that plaintiff seeking damages for fear of cancer must present evidence only of
specific fear of that condition).
146. See, e.g., Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697 (Sup. Ct.
1991) ("An unfounded fear that some harm will result in the future is not compensable .... If a claim can be tied to a distinct event which could cause a reasonable
person to develop a fear of contracting a disease like AIDS, there is a guarantee of
genuineness of the claim." (emphasis added)); see alsoJohnson v. West Va. Univ.
Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 894 (W. Va. 1991) (requiring plaintiff to prove by
preponderance of evidence that fear of disease was reasonable under all facts and
circumstances of case).
147. See, e.g., Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1371-72
(N.D. Ill. 1988) (alleging facts sufficient to constitute reasonable fear, but failing to
allege physical injury or illness resulting from emotional distress, which raised
question of exposure to disease).
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As in any negligence action, the factfinder determines the ultimate
question of reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear. 148 For this reason,
courts are cautious in allowing the plaintiff to present evidence of his or
her fear to the jury. 149 While the issue of how evidence of the plaintiff's
fear should be presented to the jury has not yet been raised in AIDSphobia cases, the manner in which courts resolve this issue in
cancerphobia cases is instructive. Because of the risk that jury members
will inject subjective beliefs into phobia cases, many courts in
cancerphobia litigation have enforced strict evidentiary guidelines before
admitting evidence of the cancer.' 50 In one such case, the plaintiff's testimony about his concern for his future health, even combined with proof
that he suffered from asbestosis and that asbestosis causes malignant and
benign lung disease, failed to satisfy the heavy evidentiary burden and was
inadmissible. 1 5 ' In another case, the court allowed such evidence to be
The requirement of a reasonable fear stemming from exposure to the disease
arises in cancerphobia as well as AIDSphobia litigation. See, e.g., Hagerty v. L & L
Marine Servs., Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. 1986) (permitting jury to hear
evidence of fear of cancer from plaintiff doused with toxic chemicals, regardless of
physical injury "alleged; provided fear was reasonable and causally-related to toxic
exposure).
148. Smith, 843 F.2d at 857, 859. The Smith court explained:
[I]t is the province of the jury to determine the seriousness and reasonableness of a plaintiff's fear of cancer ....
[A] jury is permitted to draw
inferences from the evidence presented at trial to reach a finding that a
plaintiff's fear of cancer is both reasonable and serious. However, the
inferred conclusion of the jury that a plaintiff's fear of cancer is serious
and reasonable may not be predicated on a general statement by the
plaintiff that he is concerned about his health, but must instead be premised on the plaintiff's evidence as to his specific fear of cancer.
Id. at 859; see In re Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. 634, 637 (D. Me. 1986) (findingjury
capable of sorting out evidence, understanding instructions and placing cancer
evidence in proper perspective).
149. See Smith, 843 F.2d at 859 (stating that "cancer evidence is highly inflammatory and understandably incites the passions and fears of most reasonable individuals"); Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. at 637 (stating that evidence of cancer is
potentially highly prejudicial).
150. Smith, 843 F.2d at 856. For example, in Smith, the district court allowed
the introduction of evidence regarding the plaintiff's fear of developing cancer,
but stated that it would not admit evidence of the plaintiff's increasedrisk of cancer
claim because the testifying medical expert could not state that the plaintiff had a
greater than 50% chance of contracting cancer as a result of his exposure to the
defendant's products. Id. The court stated that the expert's testimony about the
causal link between asbestos and cancer was relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the plaintiff's fear. Id. at 859. However, because the plaintiff had not established the proper evidentiary foundation by not testifying specifically as to his
fear of cancer, the court of appeals held that the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted the expert's testimony. Id.
151. Id. at 859. The plaintiff failed to meet the evidentiary requirement because he did not specifically articulate his fear of cancer. Id. The court explained
that
[plaintiff's] argument... requires a broad evidentiary inference as to the
state of mind of a plaintiff regarding that individual's concerns for his or
her future health. Specifically, the term "health" would have to encom-
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presented to the jury after it "admonish[ed] the plaintiff that [the court]
will be wary of any efforts to 'overshadow' the case by 'the dread specter of
cancer.' "152 Considering the modern "dread specter" of AIDS, courts deciding AIDSphobia claims may be likewise reluctant to letjuries determine
1 53
when plaintiffs' fears of AIDS are reasonable.
As previously discussed, whether a plaintiff's fear of contracting AIDS
is "reasonable" is ultimately a fact question best decided by an impartial
jury. Too often, however, these claims do not survive the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment and fail to reach the jury because the plaintiff
lacked proof of one of the "prerequisites" to the cause of action.1 54 Thus,
courts deciding AIDSphobia cases have not always provided plaintiffs an
opportunity to prove the reasonableness of their fear of contracting AIDS.
4.

Applying the Elements of Negligence and Confronting Confidentiality
Concerns

As noted, many plaintiffs bring AIDSphobia claims on a negligent 1in55
fliction of emotional distress theories or on other negligence theories.
Frequently, courts not only permit recovery to plaintiffs with an AIDSphobia claim where there is a guarantee of a bona fide claim, but also
permit recovery when the standard elements of negligence exist-that is,
where the plaintiff has proven the defendant's breach of a duty owed to
the plaintiff that proximately caused the injury. 156 Cases where plaintiffs
have prevailed on AIDSphobia claims or where claims have withstood motions for summary judgment generally include discussions of a standard
negligence recovery theory.' 5 7 In fact, at least one commentator has arpass virtually all known diseases and ailments. We are unwilling to take
such a (sic] evidentiary leap.
Id.
152. Moorenovich, 634 F. Supp. at 638 (quoting Lohrmann v. Johns-Manville,
782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986)).
153. See Castro v. New York Life Ins. Co., 588 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698 (Sup. Ct.

1991) ("Given the massive informational campaign waged by federal, state and
local health officials.., any reasonable person exposed to this information who is
stuck by a used and discarded hypodermic needle and syringe from which blood
was apparently drawn could develop a fear of contracting AIDS.").
154. See, e.g., Poole v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 698 F. Supp. 1367, 1372 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss based on plaintiff's failure to
allege any physical injury resulting from emotional distress alleged, although court
admitted plaintiff was in "zone of danger," which resulted in "reasonable" fear for
her safety).
155. For a further discussion of negligent infliction of emotional distress in
the context of phobia claims, see supra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
156. Castro,588 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (requiring existence of duty owed by defendant, breach of duty, reasonably close causal connection between contact and resulting injury, and actual loss, harm or damage); see Lipsig, supra note 15, at 3
(observing that courts allowing recovery have moved away from strict zone of danger rule and have applied more traditional tort theories of recovery).
157. See, e.g., Marchica v. Long Island R.R., 810 F. Supp. 445, 451, 453
(E.D.N.Y. 1993) (concluding that railroad owed plaintiff duty to provide safe work-

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol39/iss1/6

34

Rees: AIDSPHOBIA: Forcing Courts to Face New Areas of Compensation for
1994]

AIDSPHOBIA

gued that the recovery standards governing traditional tort claims should
apply to "phobia" torts, such as AIDSphobia. 158
In discussing a standard negligence claim in the failure to inform

framework, the elements of "duty" and "breach" inevitably raise confidentiality concerns.1 59 In the context of AIDS, where disclosure of an individual's infected condition can, and often does have far-reaching social
implications due to AIDS' societal stigma, these privacy concerns are especially troubling. In AIDSphobia litigation, difficult issues regarding the
elements of duty and breach have arisen primarily in medical treatment
settings. 160 In particular, the plight of Kimberly Bergalis, a young woman
place, therefore question of fault and causation must be left to jury and motion for
summaryjudgment was denied); Castro, 588 N.Y.S.2d at 697 (stating that to recover
on negligence claim where mental anguish and emotional distress arising from
AIDSphobia are alleged, plaintiff must establish existence of duty owed to her by
defendant; breach of duty that directly results in plaintiff's alleged condition; close
proximate causal connection between contact and resulting injury; and actual loss,
harm or damage); Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 889, 893-94
(W. Va. 1991) (explaining that defendant's own rules and regulations for posting
warning that patient possessed infectious disease clearly imposed duty on defendant to warn those similarly situated to plaintiff).
158. Galante, supra note 35, at 28. In her article, Galante discussed an argument that recovery standards for mental distress should be the same as for other
torts. Id. (citing law review article by Peter A. Bell, associate professor of law at
Syracuse University College of Law). Under Professor Bell's argument, if the defendant's negligence results in the plaintiff's mental distress, damages should be
available under the same circumstances for mental injury as they are for physical

injury. Id.
159. These concerns arise in AIDSphobia litigation most notably in situations
stemming from the doctor-patient relationship. See, e.g., Diaz Reyes v. United
States, 770 F. Supp. 58, 59 (D.P.R. 1991) (family of hospital patient who contracted
and died from AIDS after receiving infected blood transfusion sued hospital for
failing to violate doctor-patient relationship and disclose to them patient's infected
condition), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2306 (1992); Ordway v. County of Suffolk, 583
N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1015-16 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (surgeon sued county, which joined hospital as third party defendant, after performing two surgical procedures on HIVinfected patient when hospital failed to inform him of patient's condition).
160. See, e.g., Burk v. Sage Prods., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 285, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(paramedic who was stuck by needle protruding from used needle receptacle alleging product defect in receptacle); Diaz Reyes, 770 F. Supp. at 59 (wife of patient
who tested positive for HIV virus after blood transfusion at hospital alleging defendant hospital had duty to inform her of husband's condition); Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. Doe, 840 P.2d 288, 288-89 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992) (trained medical professionals giving medical assistance to AIDS-infected victims of automobile accident);
Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 329-30 (Md. 1993) (patients of HIV-infected surgeon suing his estate after learning that surgeon knew of his infection at time he
operated on them, yet did not disclose it to them); Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017
(doctor who operated on AIDS-infected patient alleging that hospital had duty to
inform him of patient's condition); Hare v. State, 570 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126 (App. Div.
1991) (hospital x-ray technician bit by prison inmate alleging hospital failed to
provide adequate supervision of inmate); Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health
Servs., Inc., No. 02A01-9110-CV-00232, 1992 Tenn. App. LEXIS 845, at *1-3 (Ct.
App. Oct. 12, 1992) (visitor of hospital stuck by needles contained in used needle
receptacle alleging that hospital breached its duty to warn patrons of purpose of
container), rev'd, 868 S.W.2d 585 (1993); Johnson v. West Va. Univ. Hosps., 413
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from Florida whose dentist allegedly infected her with the AIDS virus, has
focused national attention on the issue of AIDS transmission in the health
care community.16 1 Bergalis heightened AIDS awareness in American society by fighting for the AIDS testing of health care providers and disclosure of those who are infected.1 62 Similar arguments, have been made
urging the disclosure of patients' HIV status in the interest of protecting
163
health care providers.
Without legislative direction, courts, in avoiding what many feel to be
inappropriate judicial policy-making, are hesitant to impose a duty on
health care institutions to disclose a patient's HIV-infected status to third
parties.1 6 4 However, guidance in the form of policy statements is already
forthcoming in the medical community. 16 5 The American Medical AssociS.E.2d 889, 891 (W. Va. 1991) (hospital security officer bitten by infected patient
alleging that hospital had duty to inform of patient's condition).
161. See Bruce Lambert, Kimberly Bergqlis is Dead at 23; Symbol of Debate Over
AIDS Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at D9 (discussing Bergalis' contracting AIDS
virus from her dentist and dying at age 23 from disease); Private Grief, PublicDebate
Over the Requirement to Test Medical Personnelfor AIDS Editorial,43 NAT'L REv., July 29,

1991, at 14 (observing that Bergalis died because dentist decided that he had no
duty to inform her of his HIV virus); Jacob Weisberg, The Accuser: Kimberly Bergalis,
AIDS Martyr, 205 NEw REPUBLIC 17, Oct. 21, 1991, at 12 (noting that Bergalis case
changed public health policy inAmerica by conclusion that it is possible to contract HIV from doctor or dentist).
162. See Lambert, supra note 161, at 9 (describing Bergalis' testimony before
congressional committee). As the following excerpt suggests, Bergalis' testimony
before a congressional committee has been described as very emotional:
In a dramatic moment, the frail Ms. Bergalis was wheeled into a Capitol
hearing room in October [1991] to support a bill for [AIDS testing] policies. "I did not do anything wrong, yet I am being made to suffer like
this," she whispered. "My life has been taken away. Please enact legislation so that no other patient or health care provider will have to go
through the hell that I have."
Id.
163. See Arlene C. Jech, A Case for AIDS Testing, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July
19, 1991, at A25. Jech raises the point that hospital patients are routinely tested for
tuberculosis as part of admission physical examinations. Id. Also, syphilis tests are
mandatory for couples before obtaining a marriage license. Id. In each case, the
test results are kept confidential, and only the health care institution knows the
test results. Id. Jech hypothesizes that, had the medical community treated tuberculosis and syphilis in the manner it is treating the AIDS virus, these diseases, too,
would abound in epidemic proportions. See id. Universal testing, on the other
hand, the author argued, would result in the outpouring of funds necessary to find
a cure for AIDS. Id.
164. Although medical research indicates that "with proper barrier techniques, the risk of HIV transmission during surgery is extremely low," the legal
community has long held that the seriousness of potential harm, as well as its
probability, contributes to a duty to prevent it. Faya, 620 A.2d at 333 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Or TORTS § 293(c) cmt. c (1965)). Thus, "while it may be
unlikely that an infected doctor will transmit the AIDS virus to a patient during
surgery, the patient will almost surely die if the virus is transmitted." Id.
165. The policy statement adopted by the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association regarding HIV-infected physicians illustrates this:
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ation's Code of Medical Ethics has addressed the issue of HIV-infected
166
physicians who continue to provide health care services.
The decision of the United States District Court for the District of
Puerto Rico in Diaz Reyes v. United States167 illustrates one court's reluc16 8
tance to impose a duty on hospitals to disclose patients' test results.
The Diaz Reyes court noted that such disclosure raises two concerns:

(1)

that disclosure implicates privacy concerns and violates the doctor-patient
It should be noted that transmission of HIV from an infected physician to a patient has not yet been reported, but it is a theoretical possibility during invasive procedures. It is longstanding AMA policy that when
the scientific basis for patient protection policy decisions are unclear, the,
physician must err on the side of protectingpatients.
That being the case, the following recommendations should be followed in the management of an HIV-infected health care worker:
HIV-infected physicians should disclose their HIV seropositivity to a
public health officer or local review committee, and should refrain from
doing procedures that pose a significant risk of HIV transmission or perform these procedures only with the consent of the patient and the permission of a local review committee. This committee will determine the
activities the physician can continue to perform. Faya, 620 A.2d at 334
(quoting Digest of HIV/AIDS Policy, AM. MED. Assoc., Sept. 14, 1992 (emphasis added)).

166. Current Opinions, Code of Medical Ethics, AMA

COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND

(1992).
A physician who knows that he or she has an infectious disease, which if
contracted by the patient would pose a significant risk to the patient,
should not engage in any activity that creates a risk of transmission of that disease
to the patient. The precautions taken to prevent the transmission of a contagious disease to a patient should be appropriate to the seriousness of
the disease and must be particularly stringent in the case of a disease that is
potentially fatal.
A physician who knows that he or she is [HIVI seropositive should not
engage in any activity that creates a risk of transmission of the disease to others. A
physician who has HIV disease or who is seropositive should consult colleagues as to which activities the physician can pursue without creating a
risk to patients.
Id. (emphasis added).
167. 770 F. Supp. 58 (D.P.R. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2316 (1992).
168. In Diaz, the widow of a man who died after receiving an AIDS-tainted
blood transfusion at a Veterans Administration Hospital claimed that she suffered
anxiety from her fear that she would someday contract the disease. Id. at 59. The
plaintiff raised two counts in her complaint. Id. First, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was negligent for giving the deceased the AIDS-tainted transfusion. Id.
Second, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was negligent for failing to inform
either the deceased or his wife that he was HIV-infected, resulting in their continued sexual relations and her exposure to the disease. Id. Although the plaintiff
repeatedly tested negative for the HIV virus, she alleged that "current medical
technology does not rule out the possibility that she was in fact infected, so her
fear continues." Id. at 62.
The plaintiff's exposure to AIDS, evidenced by her continued sexual relations
with her AIDS-infected husband, could not be denied by the court. Id. However,
the court precluded her from recovering, not because the hospital failed to warn
her husband of his HIV-infected status, but because it was under no independent
duty to inform her, a third party, of her husband's condition. Id. at 63.

JUDICIAL AFFAIRS
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privilege and (2) whether a non-patient has the right to know that a patient, even though it may be a family member, has AIDS.' 69 In dismissing
the plaintiff's case, the court relied on the Puerto Rico legislature's strong
stance on the doctor-patient privilege, as well as its requirement that doctors must report all AIDS-positive tests only to the Department of
Health.1 70 In further support of its decision, the court stated that the legislature had never required, or even allowed, a doctor to report an AIDS
1 71
infection to a patient's spouse over the patient's objection.
The disclosure of a person's HIV-infected status to third persons is a
topic that is currently being debated in state legislatures across the country.'1 72 The unique qualities of AIDS as a contagious, fatal and socially
stigmatizing disease underlie strong policy concerns 'on both sides of the
disclosure issue. Courts, therefore, shoulder the difficult task of following
legislative dictates regarding the permissibility of disclosure, while at the
sam6 time determining whether to recognize negligence claims brought
by third persons who may be adversely affected by the confidentiality
statutes.

169. Id. The court found that the plaintiff's claim of breach of the independent obligation to inform her of her husband's condition raised two important
issues:
The first is whether a medical caretaker has any duty whatsoever to inform non-patients of the condition of a patient. Second is the question as
to whether a medical caretaker has the right to disregard the privacy interests of the patient and through doing so violate the doctor-patient
confidentiality.
Id.
170. Id. (citing P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 24, § 571 etseq. (1989)). The law of Puerto
Rico dictates that "every person in charge of a laboratory . . .where tests are
processed for the diagnosis or confirmation of sexually-transmitted diseases, shall
report all positive or reactive results of said tests to the [Sexually-Transmitted Disease Control Program of the Department of Health] within five (5) days following
the test." P.R. LAws ANN., tit.
24, § 572 (1989) (emphasis added). Furthermore, to
protect the patient's identity, "[a]ll [of] these reports shall be placed in envelopes
marked 'CONFIDENTIAL' and kept in the files of the laboratory, and identified
by serial numbers or codes ...and only the nature of the analysis and the results
thereof shall be sent to the Program under the identification number affixed
thereto." Id.
171. The relevant statute states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he identity and information offered by patients and their sexual contacts shall be of a confidential
nature and may not be revealed by the Program, except when the patient or sexual
contact authorizes it or when dealing with a person convicted of rape, incest or
sodomy .. " P.R. LAws ANN., tit. 24,'§ 575a (1989) (emphasis added).
172. Some legislatures have adopted disclosure provisions. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.59 (West Supp. 1993) (describing circumstances
under which test results that detect presence of HIV antibodies can be disclosed to
third persons); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.656 (Vernon Supp. 1993) (same); N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAw § 2785 (McKinney Supp. 1993) (same); OHio REv. CODE ANN.
§ 3701.243 (Anderson 1992) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-502.2 (West
Supp. 1993) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 140.025 (West 1989) (same).
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CONCLUSION

While recovery for fear of a future disease is generally allowed by
courts, plaintiffs seeking damages for fear of contracting AIDS present
courts with more difficult issues than claims involving other less stigmatizing or possibly nonfatal diseases. Because much remains unknown
about the causes of AIDS, the level of understanding concerning its transmission and detection unfortunately renders suspect at the outset many
AIDSphobia claims.
The particular difficulties raised by AIDSphobia litigation may be resolved, however, by a close analysis of the factual context surrounding particular claims. Careful consideration should also be given to established
caselaw on-emotional distress claims generally, and phobia claims, specifically. Courts should be careful not to dismiss claims merely because the
fear involves the highly stigmatized disease AIDS, rather than some other
condition. In addition, plaintiffs must bring their AIDSphobia claims
mindful of the particularly difficult evidentiary and public policy issues
confronting the adjudicating courts. Nevertheless, with rapidly-evolving
caselaw available to support courts in decision-making and to aid identification of bona fide and compensable claims, AIDSphobia may soon be
recognized as yet another conventional form of emotional distress.
Victoria L. Rees
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